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Repealing Patents 
Christopher Beauchamp* 
The first known patent case in the United States courts did not 
enforce a patent. Instead, it sought to repeal one. The practice of 
cancelling granted patent rights has appeared in various forms over the 
past two-and–a-quarter centuries, from the earliest U.S. patent law in 
1790 to the new regime of inter partes review and post-grant review. With 
the Supreme Court’s recent scrutiny of the constitutionality of inter 
partes review, this history has taken on a new significance.  
This Article uses new archival sources to uncover the history of 
patent cancellation during the first half-century of American patent law. 
These sources suggest that the early statutory provisions for repealing 
patents were more widely used and more broadly construed than has 
hitherto been realized. They also show that some U.S. courts in the early 
Republic repealed patents in a summary process without a jury, until 
the Supreme Court halted the practice. Each of these findings has 
implications—though not straightforward answers—for the new 
constitutional questions surrounding patent cancellation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The first known patent case in the United States courts did not 
enforce a patent. Instead, it sought to repeal one.1 Under the earliest 
federal patent laws, passed in 1790 and 1793, any member of the public 
could seek cancellation of a patent right.2 Rival inventors, business 
competitors, potential infringers, and other aggrieved persons were 
empowered, under certain conditions, to pursue revocation.3  
For recent observers of the patent system, this history might 
come with the jolt of recognition. In 2011, in response to a wave of 
complaints about poor patent quality and the high cost of contesting a 
patent in litigation, Congress created two new proceedings for 
cancelling invalid claims. Inter partes review (“IPR”) and post-grant 
review (“PGR”) are trial-like adversarial hearings within the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (“Patent Office”), taking place before 
administrative judges of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.4 IPR has 
rapidly become popular as a means to invalidate issued patent claims. 
Designed to be cheaper and faster than district court patent litigation, 
IPR and PGR are accessible in another sense as well: they once again 
allow members of the public at large to challenge patent rights, albeit 
on limited grounds, regardless of whether they themselves have any 
liability under the patent.5 The new measures depart from historical 
practice by framing cancellation proceedings as administrative trials 
held within the Patent Office rather than in federal courts.6 But they 
 
 1. Jenkins v. Folger (D.N.Y. 1792) (unreported case minutes at National Archives, New York 
City, N.Y.); see infra Section II.C. 
2. See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, 323 (repealed 1836); Patent Act of 1790, 
ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793). 
 3. Throughout this Article, I use the terms “revoke” and “repeal” to refer to the practice of 
cancelling a patent by a stand-alone proceeding, as distinct from proving its invalidity as a 
defendant in an infringement case. 
 4. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–329 (2012) (establishing IPR and PGR).  
 5. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 321. The option to seek a declaratory judgment of invalidity, 
previously the primary affirmative means of challenging a patent, depends on the challenger 
having Article III standing via an appropriate case or controversy with the patent owner. See 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126–27 (2007). 
 6. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(a), 318, 321. A form of adversarial process for cancelling patent 
claims at the Patent Office did exist before 2011. Inter partes reexamination, a precursor to IPR, 
was available from 1999 until 2012 and allowed any person to institute Patent Office review of a 
granted patent. The party initiating reexamination was permitted to participate in proceedings 
Beauchamp_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/31/2019  4:24 PM 
2019] REPEALING PATENTS 649 
follow an older pattern in opening a public channel to attack patent 
rights that allegedly should not have been granted.  
This history has recently taken on a new importance. Opponents 
of IPR have repeatedly challenged the constitutionality of 
administrative patent cancellation.7 During the 2017 to 2018 Term, the 
U.S. Supreme Court heard and rejected one such challenge: Oil States 
Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC,8 in which 
petitioners contended that IPR violated the separation of powers 
doctrine by withdrawing matters of patent validity from the Article III 
courts and assigning them instead to an executive agency. The Court 
preserved IPR by holding that patent cancellation qualifies as a “matter 
of public rights” that Congress may properly assign to an 
administrative tribunal.9 Despite this conclusion, the constitutional 
landscape around patent cancellation is far from settled. Oil States was 
narrowly decided; the Court did not address potential arguments 
involving takings or the retroactive application of IPR to pre-2011 
patents.10 Nor did the Court need to reach the other question squarely 
presented in Oil States: whether matters of patent validity must be 
considered “suits at common law” in which the Seventh Amendment 
requires that “the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”11 The 
Seventh Amendment question as applied to IPR evaporated once the 
Oil States Court determined that administrative adjudication was 
proper.12 But the broader notion that patent validity is subject to the 
constitutional jury right—a notion currently assumed in the federal 
courts—has a surprisingly thin basis in modern case law and could well 
 
before the examiner and to appeal an adverse decision. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 314–315 (2006), amended 
by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 314–315 (2012).   
 7. See Greg Reilly, The Constitutionality of Administrative Patent Cancellation, 23 B.U. J. 
SCI. & TECH. L. 377, 379–82 (2017). 
 8. 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1370 (2018). 
 9. Id. at 1378. 
 10. Id. at 1379.  
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379. The question on which the Court 
granted certiorari ran as follows: “Whether inter partes review—an adversarial process used by 
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to analyze the validity of existing patents—violates the 
Constitution by extinguishing private property rights through a non–Article III forum without a 
jury.” Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (2017) (mem); 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at i, Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (No. 16-712), 2016 WL 6995217, 
at *i. 
 12. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379: 
This Court’s precedents establish that, when Congress properly assigns a matter to 
adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, “the Seventh Amendment poses no 
independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.” . . . Thus, 
our rejection of Oil States’ Article III challenge also resolves its Seventh Amendment 
challenge. 
(citations omitted). 
Beauchamp_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/31/2019  4:24 PM 
650 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2:647 
return in another context.13 Finally, another complication of public 
patent review waits in the wings: the question of standing to appeal an 
unsuccessful IPR challenge in an Article III court.14 
The new constitutional scrutiny of patent cancellation has 
placed history at the center of debate. Some of the questions involved 
are necessarily historical. Because the Seventh Amendment “preserves” 
the jury right as it existed prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the 
scope of the right is routinely decided after inquiries into Founding-era 
English and American practices.15 The Article III question in Oil States 
was, at least in theory, less dependent on originalist analysis. The 
“nature” of a statutory patent right is not some eternal platonic truth, 
and there is no obvious reason why it should not change along with the 
statutory scheme under which patents are created. Even so, the dissent 
in Oil States rested primarily on originalist grounds, locating patent 
cancellation among “the traditional actions at common law tried by the 
courts at Westminster in 1789.”16 The Court’s majority, while 
contending that historical practice is “not decisive,”17 placed weight on 
the fact that patents in eighteenth-century England could be revoked 
by the Privy Council as well as the courts.18 And both opinions 
repeatedly drew on historical descriptions, drawn from across the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, to characterize the nature of the 
patent grant and its relationship to the public.19 
My argument in this Article is that historical commentary on 
these points has been looking, if not in the wrong place, then not always 
in the right one. Specifically, the history of patent revocation under 
early American law has been missing.20 This omission is somewhat 
 
 13. See Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 
1675–76 (2013). 
 14. Although the statute that created IPR provides for appeal of final decisions to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, unsuccessful challengers who lack an injury-in-fact have 
been held to lack independent constitutional standing for an appeal. Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. 
Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2014). A petition for certiorari on this 
question is currently pending. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, RPX Corp. v. ChanBond LLC, 
No. 17-1686 (filed June 18, 2018), 2018 WL 3778563, at *i. 
 15. See, e.g., Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 346–52 (1998) 
(applying the Seventh Amendment to copyright statutory damages determinations); Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376–83 (1996) (reviewing the question of whether 
patent claim construction was subject to the jury right under late eighteenth-century English 
practice). 
 16. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1381 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 
U.S. 462, 484 (2011)). 
 17. Id. at 1378 (majority opinion). 
 18. Id. at 1377. 
 19. See id. at 1374–78; id. at 1381–85 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 20. For example, the Founding-era history of statutory revocation does not appear in the Oil 
States opinions, nor does it feature in the leading Federal Circuit opinions on the constitutionality 
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forgivable: although statutory patent repeal existed for the first forty-
six years of American patent law, we have until now known very little 
about its workings. But it is a problem for several reasons.  
For one, the American law of repeal holds a crucial, and hitherto 
unappreciated, position relative to the first constitutional amendments. 
The reason is that the United States had a patent law before it had a 
Bill of Rights.21 This fact necessarily inserts the 1790 Patent Act into 
certain originalist inquiries. For example, the Seventh Amendment is 
often said to preserve “the right which existed under the English 
common law when the amendment was adopted.”22 That makes sense 
in most cases. In most fields of law, it is difficult to describe a coherent, 
distinct American common law before 1791, so English practice makes 
a plausible baseline for founding expectations about the common law’s 
scope. But if the Act of 1790 adopted a form of patent revocation that 
was distinct from English antecedents, then the Seventh Amendment 
inquiry for patent validity should arguably turn on whether that 
proceeding included a jury trial.23 The proxy value of deferring to 
English practice thus loses its force.  
More broadly, the history of patent revocation highlights the 
different institutional choices made by eighteenth-century English and 
American patent law. Both the majority and the dissent in Oil States, 
in surveying the Founding-era modes of patent cancellation, assumed 
that the only available models were the two English forms: a trial at 
common law or revocation by the Privy Council.24 Yet the early 
American statutes suggest that the United States had diverged in 
important ways from the forms and assumptions of the English patent 
system. The role of government, the standing of the public to bring suit, 
the involvement of a jury, and the line between administrative and 
judicial functions all took a different path in the United States.25 This 
point only reinforces the dangers of engaging in an Anglocentric 
 
of IPR: MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015); and Cascades 
Projection LLC v. Epson Am., Inc., 864 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (denying petition for initial 
hearing en banc). 
 21. The Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat 109 (repealed 1790), became law on April 10 of that 
year. The first ten amendments to the Constitution were ratified as of December 1791. U.S. CONST. 
amends. I–X.  
 22. Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935). 
 23. The Supreme Court has acknowledged, but not resolved, the challenge that might be 
posed by American understandings conflicting with English practice in this context. See 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 n.3 (1996) (“Our formulations of the 
historical test do not deal with the possibility of conflict between actual English common-law 
practice and American assumptions about what that practice was, or between English and 
American practices at the relevant time. No such complications arise in this case.”). 
 24. See 138 S. Ct. at 1377–78; id. at 1381–83 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
 25. See infra Part II. 
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originalism: not only is it inapposite to look solely at English practice 
but it is also problematic to read the early American law as though it 
merely replicated the system of royal patents.  
Finally, the early American law of patent revocation forced 
courts to articulate certain assumptions about the source and nature of 
patent protection. Was the patent a purely statutory creation, or was it 
embedded in the common law? What was the nature of the public’s 
interest in an issued patent? If every patent was granted subject to 
some public right of revocation, then what were the grounds of that 
right, and what protections were afforded to the patentee? All of these 
questions were aired under America’s first patent laws, and all speak 
to the ways in which a patent was considered a public or private right. 
Whether one sees this history as authoritative, persuasive, or merely 
informative for the purposes of modern constitutional decisionmaking 
depends on one’s prior convictions about constitutional interpretation 
and construction. But if history is to be invoked, then the history of 
patent revocation should be included. 
To that end, this Article seeks to uncover the forgotten early 
history of American patent cancellation. Using new archival sources, it 
adds to and revises existing accounts of America’s first patent laws.26 
Part I traces the background of English patent law, less for its own sake 
than for the institutional and doctrinal legacy that American law would 
have to adopt, adapt, or move beyond. Part II then reconstructs early 
American statutes and practices. Some detective work is involved here. 
Because of the scarcity of traditional legal authorities—i.e., reported 
decisions or treatises—describing the law of patent repeal, 
understanding this legal regime means tracking the law in action. The 
results are revealing: revocation was more widely used and more 
broadly construed than has hitherto been realized, and the nature of 
the judge’s power to repeal a patent, with or without a jury, was a 
disputed issue not settled until well past the Founding era. 
The aim of this Article is not to take a firm position on the 
questions of constitutionality that faced the Court in Oil States or that 
future constitutional scrutiny of patent cancellation must resolve. But 
 
 26. The leading scholarly account of patent cancellation under the 1790 and 1793 Acts is by 
Professor Mark Lemley. See Lemley, supra note 13 at 1693–67. The best review of eighteenth-
century English practice is the Brief for H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui and Sean Bottomley as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (No. 16-712), 2017 WL 3634324 
[hereinafter Brief for Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley]. See also H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui & Sean 
Bottomley, Privy Council and Scire Facias 1700–1883: An Addendum to the Brief for H. Tomás 
Gómez-Arostegui & Sean Bottomley as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party (last revised Nov. 
8, 2017) (unpublished paper) [hereinafter Addendum to the Brief for Gómez-Arostegui & 
Bottomley], https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3054989 [https://perma.cc/K9H7-
QRS4].  
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I hope to identify and explain the historical complications with which 
those conclusions must engage. 
 I. THE ENGLISH BACKGROUND: SCIRE FACIAS IN THE NAME OF THE 
CROWN 
American patent law emerged from English antecedents but did 
not simply replicate them. Formally, the starting point of each country’s 
scheme was quite different: an English patent was a grant of royal 
privilege, granted as a matter of “grace and favour” by the Crown.27 A 
United States patent was a constitutionally authorized exclusive right, 
intended “to promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.”28 Even so, many 
of the essential characteristics of the regimes were similar. Both 
countries conferred a fourteen-year term of protection based on a 
written specification of the invention and privately enforced through 
the courts. The Founding era also saw substantial convergence between 
the two regimes. English patent law during the later eighteenth century 
drifted toward a less discretionary and more ordered conception of the 
patent, reimagining the royal privilege as a public benefit bestowed on 
the patentee in return for disclosure of the invention.29 Meanwhile, the 
U.S. patent retained much of the character of an ad hoc patronage grant 
and only gradually gained the trappings of a bureaucratically 
administered right. American patents in the early Republic were, in the 
words of one historian, “a republican version of the traditional English 
patent framework.”30 Americans contemplating their patent law often 
drew sharp distinctions between the two national orders.31 But at the 
same time, conceptual and doctrinal borrowing from England was 
pervasive.32  
 
 27. OREN BRACHA, OWNING IDEAS: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, 1790–1909, at 22 (2016); W.M. HINDMARCH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO 
PATENT PRIVILEGES FOR THE SOLE USE OF INVENTIONS 3 (London, V. & R. Stevens & G.S. Norton 
& W. Benning & Co. 1846).   
 28. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.  
 29. BRACHA, supra note 27, at 22, 24–25.  
 30. Id. at 195.  
 31. See, e.g., id. at 191 (quoting the 1793 statement of Congressman William Vans Murray, 
who contrasted the American notion of patents as “right[s] in the inventions [one] may make” with 
the English conception of patents as “privilege[s] bestowed”).  
 32. Justice Joseph Story, one of the principal architects of early American patent 
jurisprudence, began an 1818 essay on the subject by declaring that “[t]he patent acts of the United 
States are, in a great degree, founded on the principles and usages which have grown out of the 
English statute on the same subject.” Joseph Story, On the Patent Laws, 16 U.S. app. 13, 13 (1818). 
The first American patent treatise cited almost entirely English authorities. See THOMAS GREEN 
FESSENDEN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW INVENTIONS (Boston, D. Mallory & Co. 
1810). 
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In their English form, exclusive rights for inventions were royal 
grants of privilege under “letters patent”—a category that included 
patents for invention, as well as a wide range of other grants, 
monopolies, and offices. Sir William Blackstone, in his Commentaries 
on the Laws of England, described the king’s grants as “lands, honours, 
liberties, franchises, or ought besides . . . contained in charters, or 
letters patent, that is, open letters, literae patentes: so called, because 
they are not sealed up, but exposed to open view . . . .”33  
The Crown granted, and the Crown could take away. For most 
of the period between the seventeenth century and the beginning of the 
twentieth, English patents for invention included a standard revocation 
clause permitting the monarch to withdraw the grant if it were deemed 
contrary to law or “prejudicial” or “inconvenient” to the realm or to the 
king’s subjects, or if the invention was not new or not the work of the 
patentee.34 Grounds for repeal included not only considerations such as 
novelty and priority but also requirements that the invention be put 
into use, as well as broader questions about its impact on employment 
and trade.35 During the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the 
principal means for implementing this proviso was the Privy Council, a 
body made up of the monarch’s close advisors, which had the power to 
adjudicate both patent enforcement and petitions for revocation.36 Privy 
Council deliberations on these matters included debates about the 
public policy merits of specific monopolies.37  
During the eighteenth century, the role of the Privy Council in 
patent disputes faded.38 Revocation came to rest less on a patent’s 
 
 33. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *346.  
 34. D. Seaborne Davies, The Early History of the Patent Specification, 50 LAW Q. REV. 86, 102 
(1934). The revocation clause continued to be prescribed through the enactment of the Patent Act 
of 1902, by which time applications for revocation were handled by the Board of Trade of the Privy 
Council. See Form of Petition for Grant of Compulsory License or Revocation of Patent, in 9 THE 
STATUTORY RULES AND ORDERS REVISED 50, 50 (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1904).  
 35. See Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600–1836: How Patents Became 
Rights and Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 189–90 (2004) (recounting the Privy 
Council’s ability to revoke patents found to be “inconvenient or prejudicial to the realm” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual 
History, 1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1278–81 (2001) (describing instances in which patents 
were voided for, among other things, discontinued use). 
 36. See E. Wyndham Hulme, Privy Council Law and Practice of Letters Patent for Invention 
from the Restoration to 1794, 33 LAW Q. REV. 63 (1917) (examining the records of the Privy Council 
in order to formulate a limited history of patent law).  
 37. SEAN BOTTOMLEY, THE BRITISH PATENT SYSTEM DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 
1700–1852, at 105 (2014); Bracha, supra note 35, at 190.   
 38. The role of the Privy Council in patent adjudication began to wane as early as 1688. 
BOTTOMLEY, supra note 37, at 111. Revocation cases persisted somewhat longer, with Privy 
Council involvement fading out in the later eighteenth century. BRACHA, supra note 27, at 22.  
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political economy and more on judicial scrutiny. This was the province 
of the writ of scire facias.  
This form of litigation would repeatedly shape the assumptions 
of American doctrine, so it is worth unpacking its baroque form here. 
Scire facias (literally, “make known”) was a writ founded on some 
official record, such as a record of court proceedings or a conveyance by 
the sovereign.39 Delivery of the writ required the defendant to show 
cause why the record might not be brought into court or have its subject 
matter overturned.40 The writ traversed the landscape of royal 
privileges, applying to mistaken or unlawful grants by the Crown, to 
offices neglected by their incumbents, and to franchises deemed abused 
by the holder or injurious to some vested right.41 According to 
Blackstone, a scire facias lay “[w]here the Crown hath unadvisedly 
granted any thing by letters patent, which ought not to be granted, or 
where the patentee hath done an act that amounts to a forfeiture of the 
grant . . . .”42 Surveying potential defects, Blackstone noted that 
“[w]hen it appears, from the face of the grant, that the king is mistaken, 
or deceived, either in matter of fact or matter of law, as in case of false 
suggestion, misinformation, . . . or if he grants an estate contrary to the 
rules of law; in any of these cases the grant is absolutely void.”43  
Scire facias gained steam as a means of attacking patents for 
invention toward the end of the eighteenth century.44 English patenting 
in general accelerated during this period, as the Industrial Revolution 
took hold and as patent law in the courts became more coherent. Scire 
facias became part of the response to these developments. As applied to 
patents for inventions, the writ had a number of notable features. 
First, scire facias presented a complicated mix of private and 
public action. The monarch had a right to sue to repeal a patent that he 
or she had granted. A private individual prejudiced by a wrongfully 
 
 39. Scire Facias, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1st ed. 1891).  
 40. Id.  
 41. JOSEPH CHITTY, JR., A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN: AND 
THE RELATIVE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF THE SUBJECT 330–31 (London, Joseph Butterworth & Son 
1820); THOMAS CAMPBELL FOSTER, A TREATISE ON THE WRIT OF SCIRE FACIAS 12 (London, V. & R. 
Stevens & G.S. Norton 1851).  
 42. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at *260–61. 
 43. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at *348.  
 44. Rex v. Arkwright (1785) was the first reported decision in a scire facias case against a 
patent for invention, although an earlier case, Rex v. Jacob (1782), appears in Lord Mansfield’s 
manuscripts. Five additional cases were reported between 1785 and 1800. See Sean Bottomley, 
Patent Cases in the Court of Chancery, 1714–58, 35 J. LEGAL HIST. 27, 34 n.48 (2014); Lemley, 
supra note 26, at 1685 n.49. The most comprehensive survey of litigation to date found seventy-
three scire facias cases brought between 1782 and 1852, most of them before 1830. See Addendum 
to the Brief for Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley, supra note 26, at 24–30 (cataloging the relevant 
cases).  
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granted patent also had the right to sue in the name of the king.45 These 
private actions were theoretically allowed as of right, but were not 
necessarily easy to secure. Petitioners needed leave from the Attorney 
General, who could impose costs and delays.46 At least the theory of 
individual participation was broad: as one leading authority summed it 
up, “All persons are injured by the existence of an illegal patent for an 
invention, and every one is therefore at liberty to petition for a scire 
facias to have it cancelled.”47  
Parties bringing scire facias actions also braved the intricate 
jurisdictional maze of the royal courts. To a modern American lawyer 
trying to characterize the nature of the writ—as legal or equitable, 
subject to jury verdict or judicial disposition48—the picture seems wildly 
convoluted. Because the writ was founded on an official record, scire 
facias to repeal a patent issued from the Court of Chancery, where the 
records of patents were enrolled. The Chancery Court was primarily 
known as an equity court and was headed by the Lord Chancellor.49 But 
patents belonged to a Chancery office called the Petty Bag, which 
administered the Chancellor’s separate common law jurisdiction.50 
 
 45. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at *261; FOSTER, supra note 41, at 246–47 (citing Sir Oliver 
Butler’s Case (1685) 2 Ventr. 344 (Eng.)); HINDMARCH, supra note 27, at 385–86. 
 46. See WILLIAM HANDS, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 16 (London, 
W. Clarke & Sons 1808) (“[A] writ of scire facias . . . issues out of the Court of Chancery, at the 
instance of any private person, but in the name of the King, [and] leave to issue it must therefore 
be previously obtained from the Attorney General.”); HINDMARCH, supra note 27, at 386–87 
(reporting that “[t]he fiat [of the Attorney General] . . . is always obtained as a matter of course,” 
but noting that from around 1790, attorneys general began to demand a bond of £500 and a 
commitment by the petitioner to pay the attorney’s fees of the patentee if unsuccessful, in order 
“that patentees may not be vexatiously harassed by actions of scire facias, in which they could not 
recover costs against the prosecutor”); see also BOTTOMLEY, supra note 37, at 81 n.30 (describing 
an apparently successful attempt by counsel for Boulton and Watt to lobby the Attorney General 
to stall a threatened scire facias). 
 47. RICHARD GODSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS AND 
OF COPYRIGHT 197 (London, Joseph Butterworth & Son 1823).  
 48. These questions have arisen in connection with the Seventh Amendment right to a jury 
trial on patent validity. See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 974 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. 
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995) (concluding that “[a] proceeding to repeal a 
patent by the writ of scire facias was, with respect to the factual issues raised therein, a legal, 
rather than an equitable, affair, thereby entitling the parties to a jury as of right”); id. at 984 (Nies, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that “[i]n England, prior to 1791, anyone could challenge a patent’s validity 
by a scire facias writ in equity”). 
 49. Law (or common law) and equity at this time were two separate jurisdictions, with 
distinctive procedures, remedies, and bodies of substantive law. See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY 
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 232–46 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining the unique rules and practices 
governing equity proceedings and detailing their eventual merger with law proceedings in federal 
courts).  
 50. See HENRY MADDOCK, 1 A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH 
COURT OF CHANCERY 3 (New York, Clayton & Kingsland 1817) (explaining that in the Court of 
Chancery, “the process” to issue a writ of scire facias “issued out of the same, and was returnable 
there, and entered in the office, called the Petty Bag”). 
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Scire facias was thus the rare common law action brought in 
Chancery.51 To add to the jurisdictional tangle, cases that required 
findings of fact—and therefore a jury, which Chancery had no power to 
convene—were transferred to the Court of King’s Bench for a jury 
verdict on the disputed facts at issue.52  
The final distinctive feature of a scire facias action was its result. 
Scire facias provided the only judicial means to terminate a patent.53 It 
is important to understand for these purposes that, unlike today,54 a 
finding of invalidity in patent infringement litigation did not destroy 
the claim. Courts spoke of a patent being “void” if the invention was 
anticipated or the specification inadequate.55 But if a court found for a 
defendant on these grounds of invalidity, that decision bound only the 
parties to the case. Patentees could, and in at least one case did, bring 
further suits after losing an infringement action on validity grounds.56 
By contrast, a suit for scire facias repealed the grant outright. It was 
partly for that reason that the writ became a weapon of note in the 
1780s. 
For the purposes of this Article, it is not the long early modern 
history of scire facias that matters but its sudden and influential 
resurgence in England immediately before U.S. patent law was created. 
The formation of U.S. patent law followed hard on the heels of scire 
facias’s most famous outing: the case of Rex v. Arkwright in 1785.57 The 
Arkwright case brought the writ back from a period of dormancy, and 
did so in spectacular fashion.58 Counsel for the Crown opened by 
 
 51. Older authorities debated whether the writ was also returnable in King’s Bench, but the 
instances where that was allowed seem not to have been direct actions for the repeal of the patent. 
See HINDMARCH, supra note 27, at 381–83 (discussing cases in which scire facias was made 
returnable in the King’s Bench).   
 52. Brief for Gómez-Arostegui & Bottomley, supra note 26, at 30–31. In this respect, scire 
facias actions were similar to patent infringement suits brought in Chancery, which would be 
referred to a court of law when validity was disputed. Id. at 16–24.  
 53. See HINDMARCH, supra note 27, at 64 (“The only means which the law provides for the 
repealing of letters patent, is by action of scire facias at the suit of the Queen.”). 
 54. See Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971) (establishing 
the rule that a final judgment of invalidity of a patent claim bars the patentee from relitigating 
the same claim against other defendants). 
 55. FESSENDEN, supra note 32, at 48−49. 
 56. See Lemley, supra note 13, at 1686 (noting that in eighteenth-century England, a court 
ruling did not invalidate a patent). 
 57. See THE TRIAL OF A CAUSE INSTITUTED BY RICHARD PEPPER ARDEN, ESQ., HIS MAJESTY’S 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, BY WRIT OF SCIRE FACIAS, TO REPEAL A PATENT GRANTED ON THE SIXTEENTH 
OF DECEMBER 1775, TO MR. RICHARD ARKWRIGHT, FOR AN INVENTION OF CERTAIN INSTRUMENTS 
AND MACHINES FOR PREPARING SILK, COTTON, FLAX, AND WOOL FOR SPINNING (London, Hughes & 
Walsh 1785) [hereinafter TRIAL OF A CAUSE].  
 58. Instructing the jury, Justice Buller remarked that “[t]he proceeding by scire facias to 
repeal a patent, is somewhat new in our days; none such has occurred within my memory, though 
in former times they certainly were very frequent.” Id. at 172.  
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informing the jury “that a case of greater importance, of greater value 
to the individuals disputing it, and to the public in general, was never 
yet tried in this or any other [c]ourt,”59 and that a decision upholding 
the patent would “endanger the loss of the most valuable manufactory 
that this country knows.”60  
Richard Arkwright’s machines for spinning and carding had 
transformed textile manufacture in Britain, and for more than a decade 
prior to Rex v. Arkwright, his patents had hung menacingly over the 
Lancashire heartland of the industry.61 Arkwright’s prior litigation 
record was mixed: His key patent for a carding machine had stumbled 
in 1781, after a jury in the Court of King’s Bench found the specification 
defective.62 (Arkwright’s description of the invention was notoriously 
unclear, and the inventor himself confessed to obfuscating its 
workings.63) Yet because a holding of invalidity did not by itself 
extinguish the patent, Arkwright was able to resume his enforcement 
efforts.64 Manchester manufacturers, alarmed by the renewed threat, 
sought cancellation by scire facias.65 
The course of Rex v. Arkwright taught both the power and the 
parameters of scire facias. Importantly, it embodied a shift in thinking 
about patent repeal, focusing on the validity of the patent itself and 
sidelining arguments about its social costs and benefits.66 The writ for 
 
 59. Id. at 12. 
 60. Id. 
 61. R.S. FITTON, THE ARKWRIGHTS: SPINNERS OF FORTUNE (1989). 
 62. See TRIAL OF A CAUSE, supra note 57, at 23−24 (describing Arkwright v. Mordaunt (1781)); 
John Hewish, From Cromford to Chancery Lane: New Light on the Arkwright Patent Trials, 28 
TECH. & CULTURE 80, 84 (1987) (summarizing Arkwright v. Mordaunt through the Court of King’s 
Bench records). 
 63. See FITTON, supra note 61, at 131−32 (stating that Arkwright admitted to the “obscurity 
of the [patent] specification”). 
 64. These efforts bore fruit: shortly after the scire facias action began, Arkwright’s carding 
patent was upheld in an infringement suit by the Court of Common Pleas. Arkwright v. 
Nightingale (1785), in A COLLECTION OF THE MOST IMPORTANT CASES RESPECTING PATENTS OF 
INVENTION AND THE RIGHTS OF PATENTEES 37−60 (John Davies ed., London, W. Reed 1816); 
Hewish, supra note 62, at 84−85. 
 65. FITTON, supra note 61, at 117−18; TRIAL OF A CAUSE, supra note 57, at 24.  
 66. Economic arguments against individual patents tended to have little purchase in the 
courts by this time, even in equity. See BOTTOMLEY, supra note 37, at 125 (suggesting that by the 
mid-eighteenth century “it was uncommon for defendants in equity to claim that a patent was not 
in the public good, and as such void. . . . Instead, it was much more common for them to impugn 
the alleged novelty of the invention”); see also Arkwright v. Nightingale (1785), supra note 64, at 
55−56: 
It is said, it is highly expedient for the public that this patent, having been so long in 
public use after Mr. Arkwright had failed in that trial, should continue to be open; but 
nothing could be more essentially mischievous than that a question of property between 
A. and B. should ever be permitted to be decided upon considerations of public 
convenience or expediency.  
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the prosecution led with the traditional assertion that the patent was 
“prejudicial and inconvenient to our subjects in general.”67 Edward 
Bearcroft, lead counsel for the Crown, attempted to give mercantilist 
substance to the claim, declaring that “[t]he first objection and the most 
serious, . . . is that this grant is prejudicial and inconvenient to the 
public,” because trade and skilled labor would “go into foreign countries 
if the monopoly is permitted.”68 But Justice Francis Buller interrupted 
to foreclose this line of argument. He did so for essentially procedural 
reasons: the facts needed to support a legal determination of prejudice 
had not been placed before the jury; the claim had been stated too 
generally, giving no chance for the defendant to contest its factual basis; 
and it was a “consequential issue . . . which must stand or fall by the 
other particular issues.”69  
Justice Buller’s objections depended on the specifics of the 
Crown’s inadequate pleadings, but the effect of his intervention was 
unmistakable.70 Buller’s instructions to counsel left the case resting on 
questions of the patent’s legal validity: whether Arkwright was the true 
inventor, whether the invention was new, and whether the specification 
was sufficient.71 This inquiry was a far cry from the welfarist reasoning 
of the old Privy Council revocation actions. Instead, Buller’s framing of 
the case recognized the new reality of a rapidly formalizing patent law 
with a clearer set of requirements for disclosure and validity.72 This 
posture reframed the “wrong” addressed by scire facias—not as 
oppressive monopoly, or even necessarily as fraud on the monarch, but 
as a violation of the bargain between patentee and the public in which 
an exclusive right was granted in return for disclosure of a novel 
invention. The result was to add scire facias to the collection of tools for 
policing the requirements of patentability. 
 The jury’s verdict for the Crown and subsequent revocation of 
Arkwright’s patent squarely demonstrated the new promise—or 
threat—of revocation attacks. Worried patent holders began efforts to 
form a “Patentees’ Association” to resist the “opulent manufacturers” 
 
 67. TRIAL OF A CAUSE, supra note 57, at 7; see also HINDMARCH, supra note 27, at 389 (“The 
first suggestion in a scire facias is usually—‘That our said grant was and is contrary to law, and 
was and is prejudicial and inconvenient to our subjects in general.’ ”). 
 68. TRIAL OF A CAUSE, supra note 57, at 21, 30. 
 69. Id. at 31−32. 
 70. Later treatments suggested that the case left the door open for properly pleaded economic 
arguments in a scire facias. But the same sources cite no later examples of this being attempted. 
See GODSON, supra note 47, at 194−95 (discussing Arkwright v. Nightingale and claiming that “if 
an issue were joined . . . such issue would capable of trial; and the patent might on that account 
be declared to be void.”). 
 71. Id. at 195. 
 72. See BRACHA, supra note 27, at 24 (describing the evolution of English patent law in the 
late eighteenth century). 
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who had “subscribed large sums to attack [patents] . . . by writ of Scire 
facias.”73 Arkwright’s fate sowed fear among leading patentee-
industrialists, including the pottery magnate Josiah Wedgwood and the 
steam pioneers Matthew Boulton and James Watt.74 Even in the 
absence of a suit, the political threat of the writ loomed large. A decade 
after Arkwright’s trial, Boulton and Watt’s lawyer was referring to scire 
facias as a source of “dread” and “the bug-bear that has tormented us 
for so long.”75 
Fellow inventors were not the only observers for whom 
Arkwright and his patent loomed large. An ocean away, leaders of the 
newly formed United States were engaged in efforts to build an 
industrial base and a patent system of their own. Prominent figures 
such as Alexander Hamilton and his economic advisor Tench Coxe were 
deeply involved in attempts to draw British artisans and machinery to 
America, with particular attention to Arkwright’s technology.76 
Patents, grants, and exclusive rights were central to schemes of 
industrial promotion. Against this background, Arkwright’s well-
known travails must have reminded the watching Americans that 
patents could be revoked as well as granted. 
II. “SURREPTITIOUSLY, OR UPON FALSE SUGGESTION”: REPEALING 
PATENTS UNDER THE ACTS OF 1790 AND 1793 
For the first forty-six years of the U.S. patent system, there was 
a specific statutory mechanism for cancelling patents. Successive 
governing statutes provided that any party could petition a federal 
district court to repeal a patent, within a set period after it issued, 
 
 73. H.I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION, 1750-1852, at 37−38 (1984) (quoting an anonymous letter that circulated to a number 
of inventors in June of 1785).  
 74. FITTON, supra note 61, at 140−41 (discussing Wedgwood, Watts, and Boulton’s 
communications during this period, which included an effort to regain Arkwright’s patent). 
 75. BOTTOMLEY, supra note 37, at 81 n.30. 
 76. See DORON S. BEN-ATAR, TRADE SECRETS: INTELLECTUAL PIRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF 
AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POWER 122−24, 147 (2004) (describing attempts to encourage European 
inventors’ passage to the United States, as well as attempts to engage in outright industrial 
espionage); Anthony F. C. Wallace & David J. Jeremy, William Pollard and the Arkwright Patents, 
34 WM. & MARY Q. 404, 404–425 (1977) (discussing the “American pursuit of the Arkwright 
technology,” including a U.S. patent granted to an American manufacturer for a machine that 
included components drawn from Arkwright’s patents). For some time before the 1790 Patent Act, 
Coxe apparently hoped that Congress would authorize patents of importation so that he might 
secure an exclusive right to introduce Arkwright machines. EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, TO 
PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1798-
1836, at 111 (1998). One of the first U.S. patents applied for and granted was for a warmed-over 
version of Arkwright’s invention, with the recipient being listed on the patent as “ass[ignee] of 
Richard Arkwright.” Wallace & Jeremy, supra, at 404.  
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following a showing that the grant in question was obtained 
“surreptitiously, or upon false suggestion.”77 Any presumption of 
validity that attached to the patent during infringement litigation was 
absent in a repeal suit.78  
Evaluating what this institution meant for the nature of patent 
rights and the means of cancelling them involves two related inquiries. 
First, what was repeal for? The conventional wisdom today is that 
revocation was a measure directed against fraud in the patent 
application process, or what we would now call “inequitable conduct” in 
patent prosecution.79 There is some truth to that idea. But both in 
theory and in practice, the scope of patent repeal proceedings was 
significantly broader. Most importantly, it included the ability to 
invalidate patents for general lack of novelty, regardless of the 
applicant’s intent. Revocation posited a particular relationship between 
the public and the patent: the public had not only a power to call out 
wrongful misrepresentations by patent applicants, but also a right to 
police the validity of the patents granted by the system.  
Second, what procedures and protections accompanied the 
process of repealing a patent right? The action provided by Congress 
was a judicial one, but surprisingly little was clear about what it 
involved or whether it resembled any existing action in law or equity. 
Not least among the uncertainties of the statute was whether it adopted 
English practice in the form of a scire facias. In grappling with that 
question, the courts would divide over whether American patent law 
descended from English law or began afresh.  
 
 77. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, 323 (repealed 1836). The Patent Act of 1970 
used the insubstantially different language “surreptitiously by, or upon.” Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 
§ 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793) (emphasis added).  
 78. Patent Act of 1790 § 6: 
That in all actions to be brought by such patentee or patentees . . . for any penalty 
incurred by virtue of this act, the said patents or specifications shall be prima facie 
evidence, that the said patentee or patentees was or were the first and true inventor or 
inventors, discoverer or discoverers of the thing so specified, and that the same is truly 
specified.  
(emphasis added). Repeal suits, of course, were not “brought by [the] patentee,” and the 
presumption of validity is mentioned nowhere else in the Act. The presumption was abandoned in 
the 1793 Act. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 76, at 229 (addressing the changes the 1793 Act 
made to the burden of proof in patent litigation).  
 79. See, e.g., In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 974 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated sub nom. Am. 
Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995) (“The contemporary analog of the writ [of scire 
facias directed against a patent obtained surreptitiously or by false suggestion] is thus an action 
for a declaration of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct . . . .”); Lemley, supra note 13, at 
1693 (stating the 1790 Act allowed parties to petition a court to cancel a patent for fraud or 
inequitable conduct); David McGowan, Inequitable Conduct, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 945, 948−49 
(2010) (discussing the action for cancellation as an antecedent of inequitable conduct, although 
noting that “the most natural reading” of the 1790 statutory language suggests that “false 
suggestion” did not require deceptive intent).  
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A. The Purposes of Patent Repeal 
The first U.S. patent laws included a formal mechanism for 
patent revocation. Even as the early Republic went through two quite 
different regimes of patent administration, the repeal provision was a 
constant feature. We will turn in a moment to the ways in which these 
tools were used. But first we should look to the statutes themselves, 
which on their face raised more questions than answers.  
The first Patent Act was short lived, lasting from 1790 to 1793. 
It gave the United States a single patent system with standardized 
rules of patentability and enforcement in lieu of the scattered and ad 
hoc legislative patents previously issued by individual states.80 The 
central feature of the 1790 Act was a patent board, consisting of the 
Attorney General, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of the War 
Department. These senior officials were collectively empowered to 
grant patents to novel inventions “if they shall deem the invention or 
discovery sufficiently useful and important.”81 The board, and especially 
Thomas Jefferson as Secretary of State, pursued this work earnestly, 
issuing fifty-seven patents during the lifetime of the Act on more than 
twice that number of applications.82 But it soon became clear that the 
burden imposed on cabinet members was excessive. Proposals to 
replace the Act began when it was less than a year old.83  
When the replacement Act arrived in 1793, it made a major 
change in the administration of patent law.84 The new statute abolished 
the patent board and instead created a registration system: patents 
would henceforth be issued without prior examination.85 An office at the 
State Department collected the required specifications and models, but 
questions of validity were left for the courts. This system would face 
 
 80. On state patents, see Camilla A. Hrdy, State Patent Laws in the Age of Laissez Faire, 28 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 58–66 (2013), which describes patents in early seventeenth-century 
American colonies as part of a class of exclusive rights, including those for corporate charters and 
franchises, that emphasized results rather than novelty. 
 81. Patent Act of 1790 § 1. 
 82. See P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 237, 244 
(1936) (stating that three patents were issued in 1790, thirty-three in 1791, eleven in 1792, and 
ten in 1793 before the second patent act was approved). 
 83. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 76, at 195–96 (“[O]nly seven months after the Act of 1790 
had been passed, the House appointed a committee to bring in a bill or bills to amend it.”). 
 84. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (repealed 1836). 
 85. See Patent Act of 1793 § 1 (requiring petition only to the Secretary of State and allowing 
certification by the Secretary of State if the petition conforms with requirements of the Act). The 
1793 Act also adjusted the 1790 Act’s rules for patentability, liability, and litigation defenses in 
several respects. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 76, at 223–31 (explaining numerous changes, 
including adding compositions of matter as patentable subject matter, limiting access to the patent 
system to U.S. citizens, liberalizing model requirements, reducing patentees’ ability to sue, and 
changing how damages for infringement were calculated). 
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mounting criticism over its lifetime, particularly in its later years, as 
ever-larger numbers of unvetted patents accumulated and clashed. The 
Patent Act of 1793 nevertheless had a longer career, enduring until the 
creation of the modern Patent Office in 1836.  
The patent repeal provision remained almost identical across 
the two acts. The 1790 version (Section 5 of the Act) allowed any person, 
within one year of a patent being issued, to make an “oath or 
affirmation” to the judge of the district court where the patentee resided 
alleging that the patent “was obtained surreptitiously by, or upon false 
suggestion.”86 If the matter appeared “sufficient” to the judge, he was to 
“grant a rule that the patentee . . . show cause why process should not 
issue against him . . . to repeal such patents.”87 Failure had the 
following, somewhat confusingly described consequences:  
[I]f sufficient cause shall not be shown to the contrary, the rule shall be made absolute, 
and thereupon the said judge shall order process to be issued as aforesaid, against such 
patentee . . . . And in case no sufficient cause shall be shown to the contrary, or if it shall 
appear that the patentee was not the first and true inventor or discoverer, judgment shall 
be rendered by such court for the repeal of such patent or patents.88 
The 1793 version (renumbered as Section 10) hardly differed. The one-
year period for challenging a patent was lengthened to three years, and 
the necessary allegation was slightly rephrased to read “surreptitiously, 
or upon false suggestion.”89 
 
 86. Patent Act of 1790 § 5. In full, the relevant section of the 1790 Act reads as follows: 
Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That upon oath or affirmation made before the judge 
of the district court, where the defendant resides, that any patent which shall be issued 
in pursuance of this act, was obtained surreptitiously by, or upon false suggestion, and 
motion made to the said court, within one year after issuing the said patent, but not 
afterwards, it shall and may be lawful to and for the judge of the said district court, if 
the matter alleged shall appear to him to be sufficient, to grant a rule that the patentee 
or patentees, his, her, or their executors, administrators or assigns, show cause why 
process should not issue against him, her, or them, to repeal such patents; and if 
sufficient cause shall not be shown to the contrary, the rule shall be made absolute, and 
thereupon the said judge shall order process to be issued as aforesaid, against such 
patentee or patentees, his, her, or their executors, administrators, or assigns. And in 
case no sufficient cause shall be shown to the contrary, or if it shall appear that the 
patentee was not the first and true inventor or discoverer, judgment shall be rendered 
by such court for the repeal of such patent or patents; and if the party at whose 
complaint the process issued, shall have judgment given against him, he shall pay all 
such costs as the defendant shall be put to in defending the suit, to be taxed by the 
court, and recovered in such manner as costs expended by defendants, shall be 
recovered in due course of law. 
Id.  
87. Id.  
88. Id. 
 89. Patent Act of 1793 § 10. Section 10 of the 1793 Act reads as follows: 
Sec. 10. And be it further enacted, That upon oath or affirmation being made, before the 
judge of the district court, where the patentee, his executors, administrators or assigns 
reside, that any patent, which shall be issued in pursuance of this act, was obtained 
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What did this language mean? Candidly, it was not clear to 
many, either at the time of enactment or afterward.90 The legislative 
histories of the two acts are quiet on the motivation for the repeal 
provisions,91 with two instructive exceptions. First, in early patent bills 
of 1789 and 1790, the revocation section was prefaced by a statement 
that “patents . . . may be obtained surreptitiously or upon false 
suggestions, which may not only be prejudicial to individuals, but to the 
community.”92 While constructed throughout as a private action, repeal 
promised to vindicate the interests of the public at large, not just of the 
party bringing suit. Second, the Senate committee report accompanying 
the 1790 bill observed that, under English practice, “any Person may 
sue out a Scire Facias to repeal the Patent for false Suggestions.”93 This 
note strongly suggests that the American repeal provision was 
consciously connected to the scire facias action. At the very least, it 
establishes a direct link between scire facias and the language used in 
the American repeal provisions.94  
 
surreptitiously, or upon false suggestion, and motion made to the said court, within 
three years after issuing the said patent, but not afterwards, it shall and may be lawful 
for the judge of the said district court, if the matter alleged shall appear to him to be 
sufficient, to grant a rule, that the patentee, or his executor, administrator or assign 
show cause, why process should not issue against him to repeal such patent. And if 
sufficient cause shall not be shown to the contrary, the rule shall be made absolute, and 
thereupon the said judge shall order process to be issued against such patentee, or his 
executors, administrators or assigns, with costs of suit. And in case no sufficient cause 
shall be shown to the contrary, or if it shall appear, that the patentee was not the true 
inventor or discoverer, judgment shall be rendered by such court for the repeal of such 
patent; and if the party, at whose complaint, the process issued, shall have judgment 
given against him, he shall pay all such costs, as the defendant shall be put to, in 
defending the suit, to be taxed by the court, and recovered in due course of law. 
Id.  
 90. See infra Section II.D. 
 91. See Proceedings in Congress During the Years 1789 and 1790, Relating to the First Patent 
and Copyright Laws, 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 243 (1940) [hereinafter Proceedings I] (no discussion of 
repeal); Proceedings in Congress During the Years 1789 and 1790, Relating to the First Patent and 
Copyright Laws, 22 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 352, 363 (1940) [hereinafter Proceedings II] (noting only 
that “any Person may sue out a Scire Facias to repeal the Patent for false Suggestions”); see also 
WALTERSCHEID, supra note 76, at 109–222 (no discussion of repeal). 
 92. Copyrights and Patents Bill, H.R. 10, 1st Cong. (1789), reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORIES 513, 518 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986) [hereinafter 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES]; Patents Bill, H.R. 41, 1st Cong. § 4 (1790), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORIES, supra, at 1626, 1630. This language was dropped when the repeal provision was 
removed from the section on infringement liability and given a section of its own. See Patents Bill, 
H.R. 41, 1st Cong. § 5 (1790), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES, supra, at 1632, 1636. 
 93. S. REP. ON PATENTS BILL, 1ST CONG. (Mar. 29, 1790), reprinted in Proceedings II, supra 
note 91, at 362, 363. 
 94. One cannot assume that the drafters of American patent legislation had direct access to 
English case law, but various features of the patent bills proposed in the first Congress suggest 
some knowledge of the issues that English courts were addressing. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 
76, at 92–94, 104 (“[T]he bill envisages a registration system similar to that of the English.”). 
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This does not mean that the 1790 Act codified scire facias. The 
repeal section was conspicuously different from scire facias in key 
respects. No authorization from the government was required to bring 
the suit. Litigation was in the name of a private plaintiff, not the 
government. Nor was the patent-issuing authority involved in the 
process: while a scire facias issued from Chancery as the issuer and 
keeper of the grant, an action for repeal in the United States occurred 
solely before the district judge, with no connection to either the patent 
board or the State Department, where patent records were housed.  
Perhaps the most practically important difference was the one-
year and later three-year window for challenging a patent, which also 
had no equivalent in scire facias. The limited period of post-grant 
challenge is, in fact, one of the more puzzling features of statutory 
revocation—and at the same time one of the most useful clues as to its 
function. The puzzle is this: If a wrongful patent was prejudicial to the 
public, then why should the public’s opportunity for challenge be so 
fleeting rather than being available throughout the life of the patent? 
One possible purpose was practical and prudential: to give the patentee 
eventual security against harassing repeal suits. The 1790 Act awarded 
costs against unsuccessful plaintiffs, almost certainly reflecting that 
concern.95  
In the context of the 1790 Act’s institutional design, though, it 
may be best to view time-limited repeal as an integral part of the 
administrative patent-granting process. Pre-grant opposition was an 
established notion, used in England96 and originally included in 
American patent bills, although it was ultimately removed from the 
1790 legislation and replaced with examination by the patent board.97 
Senate amendments similarly deleted measures requiring that patent 
applications be publicly advertised. That left post-grant repeal as the 
only way to register opposition to a grant and the only way to generate 
public information about the validity of the claim—information that 
was all the more valuable given that the three-man patent board by 
itself had limited ability to discover the state of the art in any given 
 
 95. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793) (“[I]f the party at whose 
complaint the process issued, shall have judgment given against him, he shall pay all such costs 
as the defendant shall be put to in defending the suit.”). 
 96. In English practice, under a so-called caveat system, parties paid to be informed of new 
patent applications and could intervene to oppose the grant. See BOTTOMLEY, supra note 37, at 
53–54 (“A caveat was a form submitted to a particular office requesting that the holder be given 
notice of any patent petition that passed through which was applicable to an area of interest as 
defined by the caveat.”). 
 97. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 76, at 135–36 (explaining that the Senate removed the 
caveat process and the right of appeal to referees from the bill originally passed in the House). 
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technology. Post-grant opposition within one year offered an inbuilt 
form of error correction for the examination process.  
From a modern perspective on the separation of powers, it may 
seem strange to describe a judicial proceeding as part of the patent 
administration. But the government of the early Republic generally, 
and Congress’s designs for the patent system particularly, often lacked 
a hard line between executive and judicial functions. Congress assigned 
the federal courts a variety of “non-contentious” matters, including, in 
the early 1790s, responsibility for administering naturalization 
petitions and Revolutionary War pension claims.98 In legislating patent 
matters, Congress similarly considered a variety of roles for the courts. 
The first patent bills of 1789 and 1790 envisaged pre-grant opposition 
being handled by two Supreme Court justices; other proposals called for 
conflicting applications to go to juries.99 Congress later gravitated 
toward a hearing before the Secretary of State and a board of appointed 
arbitrators.100 Before the adoption of the 1793 Act, some in Congress 
advocated having the federal district courts themselves issue patents.101 
Against this background, assigning the revocation function to the 
district courts might mean that the process was seen as inherently 
judicial, but it might also reflect a desire to have part of the patent-
vetting function in the hands of geographically distributed federal 
officials.  
This wider view of the courts’ role also sheds light on a central 
feature of the statute: universal standing to bring a revocation suit. 
Whether the Founding-era courts had any concept of “standing” akin to 
the modern Article III use of the term is a much-debated question.102 
Injuries to the public at large, such as public nuisances, were judicially 
cognizable.103 Such harms may have been a suitable analogy for the 
“prejudic[e] . . . to the community” recognized in the legislative history 
 
 98. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party 
Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1361–65 (2015) (explaining 
that the first naturalization act in 1790 granted federal courts the power to hear naturalization 
petitions and that beginning in 1792, federal courts were assigned responsibility for hearing 
pension claims from disabled veterans).  
 99. See WALTERSCHEID, supra note 76, at 100–103, 129, 133–36. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. at 219 (“Rep. Murray . . . presented a rather impassioned plea that a citizen should 
be permitted to obtain a patent from the judge of the district in which he or she resided.”). 
 102. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 166 (1992); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the 
Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does 
History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004). 
 103. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 102, at 701–02 (“Public authorities could get courts 
involved in suppressing . . . nuisances.”). 
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of the 1790 Act.104 But English and American courts generally preferred 
that public interests of this type be vindicated by public authorities, 
rather than by private suit, absent some discernible private injury.105 
English scire facias, as an action in the name of the Crown, was 
consistent with that approach. Revocation under the 1790 Act was not.  
Instead, statutory revocation fits with a different “public” model 
of adjudication used in the early Republic: statutes providing for actions 
by a common informer who had knowledge of a wrong but no interest in 
the controversy other than that given by statute.106 Blackstone termed 
such suits, including qui tam proceedings, “popular actions, because 
they are given to the people in general.”107 Early congresses applied 
informer suits to customs enforcement, prohibitions on slave trading, 
and other areas where private information could be mobilized to aid the 
functioning of government.108 To the extent that revocation suits were 
a tool for injecting private information into the patent system, universal 
standing could be understood as a constitutionally unproblematic part 
of the regulatory scheme.109 
B. The Design of Patent Repeal 
America’s patent repeal was an innovation, customized both for 
a specific new patent regime and for the new nation’s loose and 
decentralized judicial-administrative framework. English antecedents 
provided only a partial model. As a matter of institutional design, 
statutory repeal seems to have been an analog rather than a homolog 
of scire facias. The two shared a function and a form—both were actions 
for patent revocation available to any member of the public—but the 
American version enacted in 1790 and 1793 did not necessarily descend 
from the English.  
In fact, many aspects of the statute were left ambiguous. Two 
questions in particular would define practice under the 1790 and 1793 
 
 104. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 105. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note 102, at 701–02 (“When the maintenance of a public 
nuisance caused a particular individual to sustain special damage . . . he could bring an action at 
law against the person responsible for the nuisance.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 106. See Winter, supra note 102, at 1406–07 (describing early American statutes that provided 
“a common mechanism to regulate, by judicial sanction, governmental officials where there was 
likely to be no aggrieved party with a private cause of action”).  
 107. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 33, at *161. 
 108. See Winter, supra note 102, at 1406–07 (citing statutes of 1789 and 1794) (“The Framers, 
in their roles as members of the first Congress, passed legislation both creating and facilitating 
informers’ suits.”). 
 109. See id. at 1407–08 (suggesting that approval of informer statutes in the First Congress 
indicates “that the Framers did not view the ‘case or controversy’ requirement of Article III as 
limiting such ‘popular actions’ as informers’ suits”).  
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Acts. The first was what kind of proceeding the repeal section created. 
The second was what grounds would support an action for repeal. 
Both the Act of 1790 and the Act of 1793 were silent on whether 
patentees facing revocation would receive a jury trial. The only stage of 
proceedings explicitly outlined in the statutes was the show-cause 
hearing before the district judge, which ended in a decree to make the 
rule “absolute.”110 What followed was described only as “process . . . to 
repeal such patent.”111 We have only hints of what was envisaged by 
that term. One comes from Thomas Jefferson, who, during the drafting 
of what became the 1793 Act, questioned how repeal would work as 
litigation.112 While corresponding with Hugh Williamson, chair of the 
House committee steering the bill, Jefferson critiqued the inclusion of a 
repeal clause as “more difficult than I had on first view imagined.”113 
His concern was with strategic behavior both by and against patentees:  
Will you make the first trial against the patentee conclusive against all others who might 
be interested to contest his patent? If you do, he will always have a collusive suit brought 
against himself at once. Or will you give every one a right to bring actions separately? If 
you do, besides running him down with the expences and vexations of law suits, you will 
be sure to find some jury in the long run, who from motives of partiality or ignorance, will 
find a verdict against him, tho’ a hundred should have been before found in his favour.114  
Jefferson concluded against allowing the patentee to be sued for 
repeal: “I really believe that less evil will follow from leaving him to 
bring suits against those who invade his right.”115 The congressman, 
however, was apparently unmoved; repeal stayed in the bill. Given that 
Jefferson’s views on the matter were ignored, his letter to Williamson 
hardly qualifies as legislative history. But he clearly assumed that the 
validity challenge would involve a jury trial.  
Even years later, the law’s lack of clarity about how to try a 
repeal proceeding was conspicuous. Writing in 1816, Justice Joseph 
Story admitted that it was “not easy to give a construction” to the 
procedure laid out in the statute.116 The first step, if a judge thought the 
matter “sufficient,” was an order to the patentee to show cause why 
 
110. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793).  
 111. Id. 
 112. As a member of the patent board, Jefferson took a close interest in the 1793 Act, although 
he was not himself one of its authors. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 76, at 196–205. 
 113. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Hugh Williamson (Nov. 13, 1791), in 22 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 295 (Charles T. Cullen ed., 1986). 
 114. Id. Jefferson’s concern about “the long run” seems incongruous given the three-year 
window for seeking revocation in the statute. It is possible that Jefferson was responding to a 
version of the bill without a time limit. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Stearns v. Barrett, 22 F. Cas. 1175, 1178 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816). Justice Story offered his 
conclusion “[a]fter considerable hesitation.” Id. at 1179. 
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process should not issue to repeal the patent.117 If no sufficient cause 
were shown, the rule should be “made absolute” and “the said judge 
shall order process to be issued as aforesaid, against such patentee.”118 
But what was this “process”? Was it a trial on the question of repeal, or 
was it effectively an order to repeal the patent? In other words, was 
statutory repeal resolved by a summary hearing on the order to show 
cause, or was that merely a preliminary step before a full trial? For a 
time, this was a major source of division in the application of the Act.119 
The question of what constituted proper grounds for repeal was 
equally perplexing. Clearly, challengers had to make a threshold 
showing that the patent had been obtained “surreptitiously, or on false 
suggestion.”120 These terms required some act of misrepresentation by 
the patentee. But they said nothing about the degree of deceptive intent 
or the burden of proof needed to show it. Did one have to show that the 
patentee knowingly lied in presenting his patent application, perhaps 
by stealing the invention of another or by deliberately deceiving the 
government as to the novelty of his claim? Or was it enough simply to 
show that the patentee was not in fact the first inventor, so that his 
application claiming otherwise constituted a “false suggestion”? How 
could one even tell whether an inventor had a mistaken belief in his 
own priority of inventorship or a knowing desire to patent what he 
should not?121  
The meaning of the repeal provision hinged on one’s answer to 
these questions. If patents could be revoked only for provable fraud in 
the application, then this proceeding was a minor tool for policing 
applicant conduct. If, on the other hand, a complainant could argue that 
the invention was not new and the patentee must be deemed to have 
known, then an action for repeal was effectively a kind of suit for 
declaratory judgment of invalidity, albeit with a one- or three-year 
window for bringing the case.  
There were reasons to think that the latter view was correct. 
Most importantly, the statute itself seemed to contemplate a broader 
inquiry. After the order to show cause, repeal was supposed to follow 
“in case no sufficient cause shall be shown to the contrary, or if it shall 
appear, that the patentee was not the first and true inventor or 
 
 117. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See infra Section II.E.  
 120. Patent Act of 1790 § 5. 
 121. Experience with the doctrine of inequitable conduct two centuries later suggests that 
these lines are hard to draw. See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (enforcing an extremely strict standard for showing inequitable conduct in order 
to end a “plague” of assertions that applicants had deceived the Patent Office). 
Beauchamp_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/31/2019  4:24 PM 
670 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2:647 
discoverer.”122 Taken at face value, this language suggested that once 
the initial ex parte showing of surreptitiousness or false suggestion was 
out of the way, the question before the court would expand to cover 
inventive priority generally. The other reason to suspect a broader 
meaning of “false suggestion” is its connection to scire facias. 
Revocation under the writ in England had come to focus on issues of 
patent validity generally. American measures might be understood to 
do the same.  
Even so, one could (and parties did) argue the point either way 
based on the text of the statute. To gauge what the law meant to the 
patent system, we must look to the evidence of practice under the acts. 
C. America’s First Patent Case 
It is not widely known that the first U.S. patent case sought to 
repeal a patent. But then little is known about early U.S. patent 
litigation generally. The first reported patent case was Reutgen v. 
Kanowrs, decided in Philadelphia in 1804.123 Only five more reported 
cases took place before 1810.124 Reporting in those days was rare, 
though, and the lack of earlier published cases does not mean that no 
litigation took place. For example, Eli Whitney brought several suits in 
Georgia for infringement of his cotton gin patent, starting in 1797.125 
There is indirect evidence that litigation took place even before the 1793 
Act: Congress passed a supplemental Patent Act in 1794 that restored 
any cases that had been “set aside, suspended or abated” by the repeal 
of the 1790 statute.126 Historians have long noted that this would have 
been unnecessary if there had been no suits pending in 1793.127  
It turns out that the history of patent repeal can bring light to 
this dark corner. The best candidate to be America’s first patent case—
and, incidentally, the reason for the 1794 Act restoring older patent 
litigation—is a revocation suit under the 1790 statute.128 Jenkins v. 
 
 122. Patent Act of 1790 § 5; Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, 323 (emphasis added). 
 123. 20 F. Cas. 555 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804). 
 124. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 76, at 362 (“When the Act of 1793 repealed the Act of 1790 
there were apparently patent actions pending before the federal district courts.”). 
 125. DENISON OLMSTED, MEMOIR OF ELI WHITNEY, ESQ. 26–27 (New Haven, Conn., Durrie & 
Peck 1846) (quoting letter of Whitney’s associate describing the 1797 suit as their “first”). Whitney 
is said to have filed twenty-seven infringement suits in total. D.A. TOMPKINS, THE COTTON GIN: 
THE HISTORY OF ITS INVENTION (1901). 
 126. Act of June 7, 1794, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 393 (1794). 
 127. See, e.g., WALTERSCHEID, supra note 76, at 333–34. 
 128. Since false suggestions of priority are a theme here, I should be clear that I am not the 
first to discover the case. Edward P. Alexander summarized the revocation suit’s proceedings in a 
biography of New York’s first federal district judge. EDWARD PORTER ALEXANDER, A 
REVOLUTIONARY CONSERVATIVE: JAMES DUANE OF NEW YORK 207 (1938). Zorina Khan has already 
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Folger was commenced in the U.S. District Court for the District of New 
York on May 26, 1792.129 It is impossible to say for sure that Jenkins 
had no forerunners—the records of the U.S. courts in the early 1790s 
do not all survive—but the possibilities would have been few: the patent 
in question was only the fortieth to issue under the 1790 Act; only forty-
eight had been granted by the time the suit began, and all but eleven of 
those were less than a year old.130 
The circumstances of the case suggest a lucrative invention 
caught in an intra-industry dispute. Benjamin Folger, the patentee, 
was a merchant and a cofounder of Hudson, New York, a town originally 
settled in 1783 by whalers from Providence and Nantucket who sought 
a river port to escape British naval harassment during the 
Revolutionary War.131 Folger and his fellow transplants brought 
Nantucket’s whale-oil-fueled wealth with them and quickly established 
a thriving maritime center.132 In November of 1791, an emissary from 
Hudson visited Thomas Jefferson bearing a letter of introduction from 
Seth Jenkins, the city’s first mayor. Jenkins explained that “[h]is 
business is to obtain a Patent for Mr. Benjamin Folger, for securing an 
important discovery he hath made in manufacturing Whale Oil” and 
that Jenkins was “fully convinced that the discovery is entirely new, 
and a very important one, and that it will prove highly beneficial to the 
United States.”133 The subject matter was a method of separating out 
the sediment from common right whale oil, a process that both made 
the oil more valuable and produced material for candles.134 Folger 
estimated that the method added five hundred pounds, or 
 
offered Jenkins v. Folger as the first recorded patent case, based on its having been mentioned in 
a later treatise. B. Zorina Khan, Property Rights and Patent Litigation in Early Nineteenth-
Century America, 55 J. ECON. HIST. 58, 63 (1995). Khan reported that Folger’s patent was 
successfully repealed, although I do not believe that to be the case; I have not previously seen 
Jenkins v. Folger credited for the existence of the 1794 Act. 
 129. Jenkins v. Folger (D.N.Y. 1792), microformed on Minutes and Rolls of Attorneys of the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 1789–1841, at 116 (National Archives, 
New York City, N.Y.). 
 130. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, A LIST OF PATENTS GRANTED BY THE UNITED STATES FROM APRIL 10, 
1790, TO DECEMBER 31, 1836, at 4–6 (Washington 1872).  
 131. STEPHEN B. MILLER, HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF HUDSON 6 (Hudson, N.Y., Bryan & Webb 
Printers 1862). 
 132. Id. at 14 (noting that “nearly all of [the Proprietors] were possessed of considerable 
pecuniary means,” with one family reportedly bringing a quarter of a million dollars to the new 
settlement).   
 133. Letter from Seth Jenkins to Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 7, 1791), in 22 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 113, at 264. 
 134. Letter from Benjamin Folger to the Secretary (Nov. 29, 1791), in 1 TRANSACTIONS OF THE 
SOCIETY FOR THE PROMOTION OF USEFUL ARTS, IN THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 363, 363–64 (Albany, 
N.Y., Charles R. & George Webster 1801). 
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approximately twenty percent, to the profits of a whaling voyage.135 On 
January 2, 1792, a few weeks after his petition reached Jefferson, 
Folger received his patent.136   
The plaintiff in Jenkins v. Folger, commenced in May of that 
year, was Jonathan Jenkins of Nantucket.137 As recorded in the minutes 
of the U.S. District Court for the District of New York, Jenkins’s counsel 
began the case by reading Jenkins’s affirmation that “the said Patent 
was obtained upon a false suggestion” and then moved that Folger be 
ordered to show cause why his patent should not be repealed.138 The 
minutes record no further detail of the basis for Jenkins’s claim, but 
based on his Nantucket location, it is reasonable to assume that he was 
a competitor of Folger’s or otherwise involved in the whaling trade.139 
Whether Jenkins had his own claim to the invention or knowledge of 
earlier use is unknown. Three months after the proceeding commenced, 
Folger’s attorneys appeared for the hearing to show cause, and after 
arguments of counsel on both sides, the court “took time to advise 
thereupon.”140 The following day, District Judge James Duane ordered 
that the rule “be made absolute and . . . that process issue to repeal the 
patent.”141 There the record of the case ends, with no further indication 
of a trial or other proceedings in the archives of the court. 
What happened next indicates both that Judge Duane’s decision 
making the rule “absolute” had not revoked the patent and that further 
proceedings were apparently forestalled by the February 1793 repeal 
and replacement of the Patent Act. In March of 1794, Jenkins petitioned 
Congress for the repeal of Folger’s grant, “which letters patent have 
been obtained by the said Benjamin Folger surreptitiously, and from 
false suggestions.”142 Folger counterpetitioned the following month.143 
The House referred both petitions to a committee headed by a 
 
 135. Id. at 364. 
136. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, supra note 130, at 6. 
 137. Whether and how Jonathan Jenkins was related to Seth Jenkins of Hudson—or, for that 
matter, to Benjamin Folger—is unclear. Both Hudson and Nantucket were awash with Jenkinses 
and Folgers in this period. 
 138. Jenkins v. Folger (D.N.Y. 1792), microformed on Minutes and Rolls of Attorneys of the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 1789–1841 at 116 (National Archives, 
New York City, N.Y.).. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Id. at 117. 
 141. Id. at 118. 
 142. H. JOURNAL, 3rd Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (1794). 
 143. Id. at 125. 
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Nantucket representative, Peleg Coffin,144 which reported in short 
order.145 The House then resolved 
[t]hat the District Court of the United States for the State of New York, be authorized and 
empowered to proceed in the trial of the suit instituted in the said Court by Jonathan 
Jenkins against Benjamin Folger, for the repeal of certain letters patent granted to the 
said Benjamin Folger, . . . on the principles established by the act [of 1790].146  
Coffin’s committee was directed to prepare legislation to that end.147 
Five days later, the committee presented what would become the Act of 
1794 to restore all cases interrupted in 1793—leaving little doubt that 
this legislation was the product of Jenkins and Folger’s suit.148 For all 
that effort, there is no sign that Jenkins or Folger renewed their 
dispute.  
Jenkins v. Folger is a truncated case of which few records 
survive. Nevertheless, these scattered clues reveal useful details about 
the law. Jenkins shows that patent revocation was an active part of U.S. 
patent law at the beginning, possibly even before any infringement 
suits had been brought. The litigation hints that, as with scire facias in 
England, revocation could enable members of a trade to resist a 
prominent patent. And the case tells us about procedure under the 1790 
repeal provision, most notably that a judicial decision on the rule to 
show cause—the stage reached by Jenkins—was not believed by the 
parties to conclude the suit. Some further process was apparently 
needed for successful repeal of the patent. What the case does not reveal 
is any in-depth discussion about the content of the law or any sense of 
what “false suggestion” meant to its participants. For that we must turn 
to later practice under the 1793 Act. 
D. The Uses of Patent Repeal 
After twenty years of U.S. patent law, repeal was still a 
mysterious process. To be fair, almost everything about American 
patent jurisprudence was opaque in those days. Only a handful of 
reported decisions existed, all from after 1804, and those were in limited 
 
 144. Id. at 98, 132. The other two members of the committee were another Massachusetts man 
and a Marylander. 
 145. Id. at 132. 
 146. Id. at 135. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 138. The remaining legislative progress of the 1794 Act appears in the following 
congressional journal entries: Id. at 197–99, 208–09, 211–12; S. JOURNAL, 3rd Cong., 1st Sess. 102, 
109. 
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circulation.149 There was no American treatise until Thomas 
Fessenden’s Essay on the Law of Patents in 1810, which primarily 
described English law.150 Justice Story used to say that when he heard 
his first patent case as a judge, the law was so “vague and unsettled” 
that he would have sweated through his wig had he worn one.151  
The law of repeal under Section 10 of the 1793 Patent Act was 
especially opaque. Few such actions were known to have taken place. 
Apart from Jenkins v. Folger, no repeal cases occurring before 1806 
have yet come to light in the archives. Fessenden, the treatise writer, 
knew of only one repeal suit: Perkins v. Odiorne, begun in Boston at the 
end of 1809.152 He reported that, despite eminent counsel on both sides, 
“there existed considerable doubt and hesitancy relative to the most 
eligible mode of proceeding, as there are no American precedents, 
applicable to this case.”153 A decade later, one judge declared that  
[t]he true meaning of the tenth section of the patent law is indeed a great mystery. The 
profound obscurity in which, like the oracles of old, it is delivered to us, must continue to 
perplex the minds of men until a wiser generation shall arise to develope [sic] the hidden 
wisdom, and penetrate the dubious intentions of its authors.154 
Between the 1810s and the end of repeal in 1836, litigants and 
judges moved to fill this vacuum. As the examples that follow 
demonstrate, the way they did so suggests the breadth of revocation 
actions. The manuscript records of cases in the federal court archives, 
plus a handful of reported decisions, show a law that was not merely 
used to chastise fraudulent behavior by patent applicants. Instead it 
was deployed, and increasingly celebrated, as a way to subject patents 
to the examination for validity that they otherwise lacked under the 
registration-only 1793 Act. To put it in modern terms, rather than 
treating Section 10 only as a kind of action against inequitable conduct 
(the term now used for deliberate deception in patent prosecution), 
plaintiffs shaped it into two different roles: as a kind of suit for 
declaratory judgment of invalidity and as a species of derivation 
hearing between an inventor and an alleged plagiarist. 
 
 149. WALTERSCHEID, supra note 76, at 362–65 (observing that “[f]or a number of years, both 
the federal courts and the counsel that appeared before them would have had easier access to the 
reported patent law opinions in Great Britain than they would have to those in the United States”). 
 150. FESSENDEN, supra note 32. 
 151. JOSEPH STORY, 1 LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 237 (William Wetmore Story ed., 
Boston, Little & Brown 1851). The date of Justice Story’s first patent case is unknown, but he 
became a judge in 1811. 
152. FESSENDEN, supra note 32, at 175. 
 153. Id. at 176. Due to the dearth of American authority, Fessenden reproduced a summary of 
scire facias from an English digest. Id. at 179–81. 
 154. McGaw v. Bryan, 16 F. Cas. 96, 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1821). 
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Most early repeal cases arose directly from the central feature of 
the 1793 Act: the lack of any prior examination for validity. The Patent 
Office had no power to refuse a patent, even if it knew of previous 
patents on the invention.155 “Interfering” applications for the same 
invention could be subjected to a panel of arbitrators to determine 
priority, but these proceedings did not extend to issued patents.156 
Section 10 offered a way for patentees and patent applicants to knock 
out conflicting grants after they issued. The earliest case (after 
Jenkins v. Folger) thus far located in the archives took this form.157 
John Lamb, the owner of an 1803 patent to Simeon Rouse for a form of 
shipboard stove called a “cabouse,” sued to repeal George Youle’s newly 
issued 1806 cabouse patent, asserting that Rouse was the true 
inventor.158 Another patentee who found his prerogatives threatened by 
later arrivals was Jethro Wood, widely hailed as the pioneer of the iron 
plough and a vigorous enforcer of his own 1819 patent.159 Wood sued on 
multiple occasions to repeal later patents that he thought intruded on 
his rights.160 Jesse Delano, a prominent maker of fireproof safes and 
owner of a patent issued to his father in 1826, similarly seems to have 
policed later grants that claimed his father’s invention.161 
If these suits were effectively interference cases—priority 
disputes among rival inventors—others resembled what we would now 
think of as derivation actions: contests about whether a patentee had 
obtained his idea from another inventor. Despite the statutory 
requirement that the plaintiff show “surreptitious[ness] or . . . false 
suggestion,”162 only a subset of repeal suits alleged deliberate copying 
of an earlier inventor’s work. Samuel Stone of Vermont sought repeal 
 
 155. WILLIAM THORNTON, PATENTS (1811), reprinted in 6 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 98 (1923) (stating, 
in a pamphlet issued by the Superintendent of Patents, that “as there is at present no discretionary 
power to refuse a patent, even where no just claim exists, it may appear proper to caution the 
purchaser of rights, against the supposition that the invention,patented, is always valuable, or 
new, or that it interferes with no previous patent”). 
 156. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 9, 1 Stat. 318–23 (repealed 1836). 
 157. Lamb v. Youle (D.N.Y. 1806), microformed on M965, roll 2 (National Archives, New York 
City, N.Y.).  
 158. Affidavit of John Gove, Lamb v. Youle (D.N.Y. 1806). 
 159. See FRANK GILBERT, JETHRO WOOD, INVENTOR OF THE MODERN PLOW 50–51 (Chicago, 
Rhodes & McClure 1882) (noting that Jethro Wood “very nearly exhausted all his property in 
unavailing endeavors to establish through the courts his rights as inventor and patentee”). 
 160. Ex Parte Wood, 22 U.S. 603 (1824) (appeal resulting from Wood’s suit to repeal the 1820 
plough patent of Charles Wood and Gilbert Brundage); Wood v. Dutcher (S.D.N.Y. 1824), 
microformed on M965, roll 2 (National Archives, New York City, N.Y.) (challenge to Dutcher’s 
plough patent of 1822). 
 161. Delano v. Scott, 7 F. Cas. 378, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1835) (No. 3,753); Delano v. Gaylor, (S.D.N.Y. 
1833), microformed on M965, roll 2 (National Archives, New York City, N.Y.). 
 162. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, 323 (repealed 1836); see also Patent Act of 
1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793). 
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of Ezekiel Olds’s circular-saw patent of 1808 on the ground that Olds 
had obtained it “well knowing” that Stone was the true inventor.163 
Other cases gave more detail of the alleged plagiarism. Hezekiah Kelley 
of Brooklyn complained that he had shown his fireproof distillery 
equipment to one William Rapp, who hoped to reduce the 
flammability—and reassure the neighbors—of his own planned 
turpentine works. Rapp had then proceeded to Washington and 
obtained a patent mere weeks ahead of Kelley.164 Disputes between 
collaborators were another potential source of conflict. In 1806, both the 
silk dyer William Barrett and the mechanic Abner Stearns applied for 
patents on the dyeing machine Stearns had built for Barrett.165 Stearns 
later sued to repeal Barrett’s patent, claiming to have been the true 
inventor, while Barrett retorted that Stearns had constructed the 
machine to Barrett’s design.166  
As time went on, repeal suits took on an expanded character. 
Especially during the later years of the 1793 Act, numerous repeal cases 
simply alleged that the patented invention was not new. For example, 
James Hanrahan sued the leading industrialist Jordan Mott in 1835 on 
the theory that Mott was not the true inventor of his patented 
anthracite coal stove.167 Hanrahan alleged only that “the same was 
known by others” before Mott’s purported discovery—essentially the 
traditional defense of invalidity by anticipation but imported into the 
repeal action.168 Reported decisions of the courts indicated a focus on 
questions of novelty rather than fraud. Allegations of false suggestion 
were found to be adequately supported by “evidence, tending to show, 
that the manufacture . . . was not new, or, in other words, that they 
were not the true inventors or discoverers.”169 Likewise, hearings on 
 
 163. Complaint of Samuel Stone (filed Apr. 10, 1811), Stone v. Olds (D. Mass. 1811) 
(unreported case available at National Archives, Boston, Mass.).   
 164. Affidavits of Jacob Gerhart and Hezekiah Kelley, Kelley v. Rapp (S.D.N.Y. 1816), 
microformed on M965, roll 2 (National Archives, New York City, N.Y.). Rapp and Kelley received 
their patents in December 1815 and February 1816 respectively. See S. ALFRED ELLIOT, A LIST OF 
PATENTS GRANTED BY THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE ARTS AND SCIENCES, 
ALPHABETICALLY ARRANGED, FROM 1790 TO 1820, at 18 (Washington, D.C., self-published 1823). 
 165. Stearns v. Barrett (D. Mass. 1814–16) (unreported case available at National Archives, 
Boston, Mass.). Stearns received his patent in 1806. Barrett, after initially letting his application 
lapse, obtained a patent in 1809. See id. at Exhibits E, F, G, and K. 
 166. Depositions of Hugh Thompson, Robert Emes, Mesach Shattuck & George Barrett, 
Stearns v. Barrett (D. Mass. 1814–16). 
 167. Petition of James Hanrahan for Repeal of Patent to Jordan L. Mott, March 3, 1835, 
Hanrahan v. Mott (S.D.N.Y. 1835), microformed on M965, roll 2 (National Archives, New York 
City, N.Y.). 
 168. Id. at 3; see also Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 6, 1 Stat. 318, 319 (repealed 1836) 
(establishing a defense of invalidity where the invention had been “in use, or had been described 
in some public work anterior to the supposed discovery of the patentee”). 
 169. Thompson v. Haight, 1 U.S.L.J. 563, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1822). 
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repeal investigated “the alleged originality of the manufacture . . . with 
much labour and assiduity.”170 Judges apparently embraced the theory 
that a sworn patent application for a non-novel invention by itself 
sufficed for “false suggestion.”171 Eventually this position became 
explicit: charging a jury in 1834, New York’s district judge explained 
that if an invention “had been before published in works of art and 
science, the patentee was presumed to know it,” and that any prior 
publication thus supported repeal of the patent.172 
Revocation cases of this type stretched the terms of the statute 
beyond strictly fraudulent patent applications. The incentives for 
plaintiffs to read the law more broadly were straightforward: in a time 
before declaratory judgments were available,173 repeal proceedings 
were a valuable means to bring an affirmative challenge to an 
undesirable patent. But why did judges accommodate, or even 
encourage, this move? The answer seems to lie in growing discontent 
with the shortcomings of the 1793 Patent Act. Judges’ opinions in repeal 
cases, far more than in infringement suits, referred to the growing 
pressure on the no-examination patent system and to the litigation and 
assertion activities that accompanied mounting numbers of patents.174 
The fullest explanation of this climate came from William P. 
Van Ness, district judge of the Southern District of New York in the 
1810s and 1820s.175 Van Ness was a well-connected jurist, active in 
Democratic-Republican politics, who in his younger years had served as 
 
 170. Id. at 1041; see also Morris v. Huntington, 17 F. Cas. 818, 820 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1824) (No. 
9,831) (stating that “the sixth section [of the 1793 Act] which specifies the cause for which a patent 
may be declared void, shows the great object of inquiry to be whether there has been a prior use of 
the improvement” and noting that “[t]he same remarks are applicable to the 10th section”).  
 171. Thompson, 1 U.S.L.J at 1046–47. 
 172. Law Case—On a Patent, NILES’ WKLY. REG., Oct. 25, 1834, at 122–23 (reporting the trial 
of Falconer v. Clark (S.D.N.Y. 1834)). The jury in the case may not have followed the judge in 
equating lack of novelty with false suggestion: it “found for the complainants, on the ground that 
the defendant was not the true inventor, and also further found that the patent was not obtained 
surreptitiously, or upon a false suggestion.” Id. at 123. That this was a Section 10 repeal case is 
confirmed by Falconer v. Clark (S.D.N.Y. 1833–34), microformed on M965, roll 2 (National 
Archives, New York City, N.Y.).  
 173. The federal courts gained the authority to issue declaratory judgments in 1934. See Edwin 
Borchard, The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 35, 35 (1934) (“[O]n June 14, 
1934, President Roosevelt signed the [Federal Declaratory Judgments] Act.”). 
 174. See, e.g., Thompson, 1 U.S.L.J. at 564 (claiming that “[t]he very great, and very alarming, 
facility, with which patents are procured, is producing evils of great magnitude”); see also Delano 
v. Scott, 7 F. Cas. 378, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1835) (No. 3,753) (noting that, unless the patent came before 
a court, a patentee under the 1793 Act could “avoid all examination of his right, and he may go on 
imposing upon the ignorant or timid, and lay his unjust contributions upon them”). 
 175. PEYTON F. MILLER, A GROUP OF GREAT LAWYERS OF COLUMBIA COUNTY, NEW YORK 133–
34 (1904). 
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Aaron Burr’s second in the duel that killed Alexander Hamilton.176 As 
the sole federal district judge in New York City between 1812 and 1826, 
he was a key figure in the law and practice of patent repeal. While no 
enemy of patents in principle, he became a strong critic of the 1793 
regime. In a published 1822 decision, Van Ness inveighed against the 
“evils” of the patent system, which included “[t]he very great and very 
alarming facility with which patents are procured” and the resultant 
“flagitious peculations of imposters, and the arrogant pretensions of 
vain and fraudulent projectors.”177  
Like many critics of the patent system in the years before the 
1836 Patent Act,178 Van Ness complained that “[s]ome mode should be 
devised of examining into the novelty and utility of alleged inventions, 
before patents are issued to the applicants.”179 With the same breath, 
he explained that any patent used before the date of application was 
“obtained surreptitiously and upon false suggestion.”180 If the law would 
not screen patents for novelty before issue, Van Ness reasoned, then a 
repeal action could do it afterward.181 In his view, “[t]hat a summary 
inquiry into the nature, novelty, utility, and validity of these grants 
ought to be somewhere provided for and made, must be obvious to the 
common sense of the world.”182 For the power of examination to reside 
with the courts, he pointed out, was not so outlandish: before the 1793 
Act, Congress had considered proposals to have patents granted by the 
district courts.183 
 
 176. See LIN-MANUEL MIRANDA, The World Was Wide Enough, on HAMILTON (ORIGINAL CAST 
RECORDING) (Warner Music Group 2015) (“BURR: We rowed across the Hudson at dawn My friend 
William P. Van Ness signed on as my—BURR AND COMPANY: Number two!”); see also MILLER, 
supra note 175, at 133–35 (describing William P. Van Ness’s connections with Aaron Burr). 
 177. Thompson, 1 U.S.L.J. at 564. 
 178. See Steven Lubar, The Transformation of Antebellum Patent Law, 32 TECH. & CULTURE 
932, 936–42 (1991) (explaining various criticisms of the early patent system, including those of 
Justice Story, who “often [found] that patents were insufficiently useful or not genuinely 
inventive”). 
 179. Thompson, 1 U.S.L.J. at 566. 
 180. Id. at 578. 
 181. Id. 
 182. McGaw v. Bryan, 16 F. Cas. 96, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1821) (No. 8,793). 
 183. Id.:  
It was originally proposed in congress, to vest the power of granting patents, in the 
district courts, and to connect with it the English system of proceeding upon caveats; 
thus affording to the public and particular objectors an opportunity of being heard, in 
opposition to the application, before the letters issued.;  
see also WALTERSCHEID, supra note 76, at 101–03, 219 (discussing the process for the 
administrative office to refer the matter to two Supreme Court justices if a petition opposing a 
patent has merit and remarking on a proposal which would have allowed citizens to obtain patents 
from district court judges). 
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Van Ness was not the only judge who saw repeal proceedings as 
a bulwark against the oppressive assertion of wrongful patents. His 
successor as U.S. district judge in New York, Samuel Betts, wrote that 
the Section 10 remedy “puts in possession of the Public a most 
convenient relief against indefensible Monopolies and vexatious 
prosecutions thereon.”184 Joseph Hopkinson, the district judge in 
Philadelphia from 1828 to 1842, came around gradually to the idea that 
repeal proceedings should apply to general lack of novelty.185 In doing 
so, Hopkinson characterized Section 10 as a weapon against spurious 
patent assertion: 
A case is recorded of a patent for using the common stone coal in a common blacksmith’s 
forge. The patentee went through the country exhibiting his parchment patent with the 
great seal of the department of state, and the signatures of the high officers of government 
appended to it. This would naturally alarm an ignorant smith, and as the patentee would 
sell him a right for two or three dollars, or for whatever he could get for it, a prudent man 
would prefer paying so small a sum, rather than go to law with an adversary apparently 
so well armed. To protect the public from such impositions, this tenth section was enacted, 
and gives the power to any person, interested or not in the discovery or the patent, to call 
upon the patentee for an examination of his right, and have it repealed.186 
In sum, the history of patent revocation before 1836 shows the 
courts grappling with a policy tool that was not clearly defined, and 
perhaps not well understood, but which was increasingly deployed in 
response to the shortcomings of the patent system. Of all the legal 
questions posed by that process, one emerged as by far the most 
controversial. It also happens to be an issue raised, though ultimately 
sidestepped, by Oil States: whether patent revocation required a jury 
trial. 
E. Summary Judgments 
At least some patents issued under the 1793 Act were repealed 
summarily, in a bench trial based solely on a hearing to show cause, 
and without the sanction of a jury.187 This development eventually drew 
a rebuke from the U.S. Supreme Court in the only Supreme Court 
decision to deal with revocation under the statute.188 In that sense, 
summary repeal may not ultimately have been good law. But it 
 
 184. Unpublished Opinion of Samuel A. Betts (1834), Falconer v. Clark (S.D.N.Y. 1833–34), 
microformed on M965, roll 2 (National Archives, New York City, N.Y.). 
 185. See Delano v. Scott, 7 F. Cas. 378, 383 (E.D. Pa. 1835) (No. 3,753) (explaining that Judge 
Hopkinson had previously charged the jury that “[t]he mere fact that the patentee was not the 
original inventor of the thing patented, is not such a false suggestion as is contemplated by the 
act,” but had been “led to doubt the correctness of this opinion”). 
 186. Id. at 382. 
 187. Ex parte Wood & Brundage, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 603 (1824). 
 188. Id. 
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persisted for years as the peak manifestation of revocation practice 
before being struck down. 
To step back for a moment: the nature of the process for 
repealing a patent under the Acts of 1790 and 1793 was initially 
unclear. Nothing in the patent acts explicitly authorized actions for 
scire facias, as practiced in England.189 And it was not self-evident that 
the revocation provisions were meant to enact a form of scire facias. 
There were compelling parallels—namely, the use of the term “false 
suggestion” and the order to show cause that initiated the proceeding.190 
But there were also stark differences, such as the lack of need for 
government permission and the one- or three-year time limit on 
challenges.191 Absent a clear model for the proceeding, the law was 
confusing on its face. If “sufficient cause” were not shown by the 
patentee-defendant in the initial hearing before the judge, would the 
patent proceed to trial before a jury? Or was the subsequent 
“process . . . to repeal such patent”192 merely a judicial order of 
revocation, needing only to be executed as a ministerial matter?      
One early organic development was that some parties, in their 
pleadings, began to refer to statutory repeal actions as scire facias 
suits.193 In the period before usable precedent had emerged regarding 
Section 10, American lawyers may have found it easiest to behave as 
though the 1793 Act authorized the English writ, despite its quite 
different design.  
The applicability of scire facias could not be taken for granted, 
however. After losing a jury verdict in the Massachusetts case of 
Stearns v. Barrett (1816), the unsuccessful plaintiff at the district court 
appealed to the circuit court, claiming that the action should have been 
treated as a summary process and resolved by the district judge alone 
after the hearing to show cause.194 Justice Joseph Story, sitting on 
circuit, openly agonized over the question. He found the proceeding 
“peculiar” and the section “not easy to give a construction . . . free of 
difficulties.”195 Eventually, “[a]fter considerable hesitation,” he 
concluded that “the process, to be awarded upon making the rule 
 
 189. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, 323 (repealed 1836); Patent Act of 1790, ch. 
7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793). 
 190. Patent Act of 1793 § 10. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See, e.g., Cutter v. Reed (D. Mass. 1811) (unreported case available at National Archives, 
Boston, Mass.) (“In the action and process of the United States, upon the motion and Complaint of 
William Francis Cutter, Plaintiffs in scire facias, against John Reed and Thomas Odiorne, 
Defendants.”). 
 194. Stearns v. Barrett, 22 F. Cas. 1175, 1177 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No. 13,337). 
 195. Id. at 1178. 
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absolute, is not a final process, but a judicial writ in the nature of a scire 
facias at the common law.”196 At the same time, Story took a 
conservative view of the repeal provision generally, setting aside the 
jury verdict on the basis that it had broadly addressed priority of 
inventorship rather than, as Story believed proper, deciding only the 
fact of whether Barrett had obtained his patent “surreptitiously or upon 
false suggestion.”197 
Because Story’s was the only opinion on patent repeal published 
in the 1810s, some contemporaries were198—and modern observers 
might be—led to believe that it represented the prevailing law of patent 
repeal. The problem with that reading is that other courts squarely 
rejected Stearns. As we have seen, Story’s attempt to restrict revocation 
actions to cases involving fraud alone was widely ignored.199 And five 
years later, New York District Judge William Van Ness declared it an 
“established practice” of his court that revocation was a summary 
proceeding in which patents might be repealed after the hearing to 
show cause.200 Van Ness reported having invalidated “several” patents 
in this fashion in recent years.201 He justified this position by claiming 
that “it was natural, and in a great degree requisite, to protect the 
public against frauds and impositions, that some expeditious summary 
mode of investigating their merits and trying their validity should be 
provided.”202 
Van Ness went on to lay out the case for why the American 
repeal statute did not incorporate scire facias. Scoffing at the “magic 
influence” that would be required for Section 10 to draw after it “all the 
statute and common law of England,”203 Van Ness stressed above all the 
 
 196. Id. at 1179. 
 197. Id. at 1180–81. 
 198. See, e.g., FESSENDEN, supra note 32, at 303–25 (Boston, Charles Ewer, 2d ed. 1822) 
(reprinting Stearns as the sole U.S. authority on the nature of the repeal provision). 
 199. Justice Story’s hometown district court in Boston—over which Justice Story had direct 
review—presumably remained strict. This may account for the fact that no revocation cases appear 
in that court’s archived case files after 1826, while the number in New York and Philadelphia 
climbed. A list of the revocation suits filed in the District of Massachusetts from 1811 through 
1826, compiled by the author from an index of cases held at the National Archives in Boston, is on 
file with the author. 
 200. McGaw v. Bryan, 16 F. Cas. 96, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1821) (No. 8,793). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. Van Ness stressed that Congress could not have meant to require slow, expensive 
trials for the purpose:  
Every presumption of reason and of law is against the position that . . . the expensive 
and dilatory forms of the common law were meant to be pursued in investigations of 
this sort. During their progress, an impostor or pretender might for a long time harass 
the community, and for a season reap the fruits of his iniquity and fraud. 
Id. at 99. 
 203. Id. at 97. 
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United States’ break from England’s patent regime. English patents 
were grants of favor from the Crown; American patents were pure 
“creatures of the statute.”204 The modes of approving grants were 
different. And while the governing English statute, the Statute of 
Monopolies, explicitly required that patents be “ ‘examined, heard, 
tried, and determined, by and according to the common laws of this 
realm, and not otherwise,’ ” the American patent statute “contain[ed] 
no direct reference whatever, to the common law.”205 Elements of the 
English system not adopted “must be presumed to have been 
discarded.” 206 Van Ness emphasized that this striking omission, along 
with the act’s “radical departure from the English system of granting 
patents . . . press irresistibly upon my mind the conclusion that the 
proceedings under this section were not meant to be according to the 
course of the common law, but that it was intended to invest the district 
judge with a plenary supervision over the legality of patents.”207 
Van Ness was not alone in this opinion. In Evans v. Eaton, an 
infringement suit decided in 1822, Justice Henry Brockholst Livingston 
of the Supreme Court distinguished the summary repeal proceeding 
provided by Section 10 from infringement suits, which he believed did 
require a jury verdict for invalidity: 
This section provides a mode of proceeding before the district court where there may be 
reason to believe a patent was obtained surreptitiously or upon false suggestions, and if 
on such proceeding it shall appear that the patentee was not the true inventor, judgment 
shall be rendered by such court for a repeal of the patent. This is the only case in which a 
power is conferred on a court to vacate a patent without the intervention of a jury.208  
Livingston’s observation was both dissent and dicta, but it revealed his 
reflexive—and uncontradicted—assumption that repeal was a 
summary proceeding.  
Other courts took the same line. In Baltimore in 1817, Judge 
James Houston of the District of Maryland conducted a hearing on the 
notorious “winged gudgeon” patent of Michael Withers.209 Newspaper 
 
 204. Id. at 98. 
 205. Id. at 97. 
 206. Id. at 99. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 450–51 (Livingston, J., dissenting). 
 209. Kirk v. Withers (D. Md. 1816) (unreported case available at National Archives, 
Philadelphia, Pa.). Withers’s 1813 patent was something of a poster-child for the vices of the no-
examination era. The inventor and his assigns enforced it widely against mill owners, deliberately 
fostering the impression that the patent broadly covered a long-standing component of mill 
machinery. In response, William Thornton, the Superintendent of Patents, waged a public 
campaign against the patent, which he had issued himself (having no power to refuse an 
application under the 1793 Act). Thornton denounced Withers as an imposter and his patent as an 
invalid grant for a trivial variation on the prior art; Withers eventually sued him for libel. See 
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reporting described the hearing as a “proceeding . . . to vacate the 
patent in a summary way.”210 Judge Houston ultimately declined to find 
the patent surreptitiously obtained, accepting Withers’s argument that 
his invention was only a narrow improvement and had not been 
anticipated.211 But in doing so, he emphasized the difference between a 
regular validity trial and summary repeal under Section 10.212 Judge 
Houston made it clear that he thought the patent invalid on other 
grounds, including lack of utility, but “that he could not, under the 
summary proceeding, decide on the point . . . that being in his opinion 
the proper province of a jury.”213  
On this issue, Justice Story held the trump card. The death of 
Justice Livingston in 1823 robbed Judge Van Ness of a Democratic-
Republican ally on the Supreme Court who had endorsed the summary 
view of patent repeal. One of Van Ness’s summary revocations was 
appealed to the Supreme Court the following year. In Ex parte Wood 
and Brundage, Story wrote for the Court in prohibiting Van Ness’s 
practice and enforcing a trial in actions for repeal.214 Like Van Ness, 
Story gave an account of American patent law that dwelled on its 
statutory origins. In Story’s case, however, the appeal was not to the 
protection of the public, but to the security of the patent right:  
The securing to inventors of an exclusive right to their inventions, was deemed of so much 
importance, as a means of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts, that the 
constitution has expressly delegated to Congress the power to secure such rights to them 
for a limited period. The inventor has, during this period, a property in his inventions; a 
property which is often of very great value, and of which the law intended to give him the 
absolute enjoyment and possession. . . . It is not lightly to be presumed, therefore, that 
Congress, in a class of cases placed peculiarly within its patronage and protection, 
involving some of the dearest and most valuable rights which society acknowledges, and 
the constitution itself means to favour, would institute a new and summary process, which 
should finally adjudge upon those rights, without a trial by jury, without a right of appeal, 
and without any of those guards with which, in equity suits, it has fenced round the 
general administration of justice.215  
Story concluded that Section 10 required “a process, in the 
nature of a scire facias, to the patentees, to show cause why the patent 
should not be repealed.”216 The resultant trial should follow the 
standard pattern of an English scire facias case: “[I]f the issue so joined 
 
Edward C. Walterscheid, The Winged Gudgeon—An Early Patent Controversy, 79 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 533, 537–56 (1997).   
 210. Winged Gudgeons, NILES’ WKLY. REG., June 28, 1817, at 283, https://babel.hathitrust.org/ 
cgi/pt?id=pst.000055571159 [https://perma.cc/WF6M-RPUB].   
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id.  
 214. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 603, 614–15 (1824). 
 215. Id. at 608. 
 216. Id. at 614. 
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be an issue of fact, then the trial thereof to be by a jury; if an issue of 
law, then by the Court, as in other cases.”217 With this determination—
which, to be clear, was statutory rather than constitutional in nature—
Story brought the episode of summary patent revocation to a close. 
CONCLUSION 
The early history of patent repeal is convoluted. On some level, 
these complications do—and should—resist easy translation into the 
terms of modern argument. Uncertainty and ambiguity clouded the law 
of patent repeal in the United States even before the intervening 
centuries left moth holes in the record of events. Yet it is precisely 
because of these confusions and gaps that we should resist “law office 
history,” or cherry-picking from the historical record, and should 
instead try to understand more fully what was going on. In that spirit, 
I close with two brief observations about how the foregoing history 
might inform present constitutional inquiries, including those recently 
made in Oil States.218 
The “Clean Slate” Question. One of the central issues raised by 
this account is the extent to which English antecedents matter. If we 
treat the American system of patent adjudication as fully continuous 
with prior English tradition, then various English practices have a tight 
grip on our constitutional understanding. For example, if we assume 
that the United States imported all English forms of patent 
adjudication—including scire facias—then the consistent use of juries 
in England supports a Seventh Amendment jury right on modern 
matters of patent validity in the United States. Likewise, Privy Council 
revocation can serve as a guide to the Framers’ expectations about 
executive prerogative in patent matters. As the Oil States Court 
explained, “Based on the practice of the Privy Council, it was well 
understood at the founding that a patent system could 
include . . . potential cancellation in the executive proceeding of the 
Privy Council.”219 While the members of the Court differed on how to 
characterize English practice,220 there is no doubt that they embraced 
the presumption of continuity and saw English law as their principal 
interpretive resource. 
If, on the other hand, American patent law broke from some of 
the assumptions of English law, both monarchical and institutional, 
 
 217. Id. at 615. 
 218. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S.Ct. 1365 (2018). 
 219. Id. at 1377. 
 220. See id. at 1383 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the historical record of Privy 
Council revocation does not support the Court’s holding). 
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then the applicability of such English arrangements fades. To be sure, 
Founding-era history offers a mixed picture of continuity and 
departure. English practice was a constant reference point, especially 
for the courts. Yet the larger structural departures were significant too. 
The process of issuing patents under both the 1790 and 1793 Acts was 
administratively quite different from the English regime. The 
conceptual starting point also differed. English patent law identified 
two points of origin: the royal grant, granted or revoked at the pleasure 
of the sovereign, and the Statute of Monopolies, which explicitly 
established that patents and their adjudication were governed by the 
common law.221 United States patent law acknowledged neither of these 
foundations. 
Seen in this light, the strong presumption of continuity between 
England and the United States is problematic. Oil States offers a 
particularly dubious example: the contention that the Framers sub 
silentio contemplated some power of “executive” cancellation as a 
counterpart to royal revocation.222 The Oil States Court presumed that 
the Framers adopted English law unless they explicitly disavowed it, 
finding no “reason to think they excluded this practice [of Privy Council 
revocation] during their deliberations.”223 Given the many differences 
between the English and early American patent laws, that seems to put 
the burden in the wrong place. And in any case, one could argue that 
there is such evidence. The Patent Act adopted by the first Congress in 
1790—based on bills introduced only one year after the ratification of 
the Constitution224—had no counterpart to Privy Council revocation. 
Nor did American patents ever include the explicit defeasance clause, 
providing for Privy Council repeal, that every English patent carried in 
its text. The only form of revocation contemplated was statutory repeal 
by the district court.  
That statute carries originalist weight of its own. Especially if 
the presumption of continuity with English law is relaxed, the Patent 
Act of 1790 becomes an important place to look when applying the Bill 
of Rights to patent questions. Where the amendments “preserve” the 
 
 221. See English Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3, § 2 (Eng.) (“[A]ll monopolies, and 
all . . . letters patents . . . and the force and validity of them . . . ought to be, and shall be for ever 
hereafter examined, heard, tried, and determined, by and according to the common laws of this 
realm, and not otherwise.”). 
 222. Oil States, 138 S.Ct. at 1377. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See Copyrights and Patents Bill, H.R. 10, 1st Cong., (1789), reprinted in 4 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, supra note 92, at 513. Ratification of the Constitution became effective on June 21, 1788. 
NCC Staff, The Day the Constitution was Ratified, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (June 21, 
2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/the-day-the-constitution-was-ratified [https://perma.cc/ 
36LH-JD38]. 
Beauchamp_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 3/31/2019  4:24 PM 
686 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:2:647 
status quo at the time of ratification, the 1790 Act may even be 
dispositive. In that case, the Seventh Amendment jury right might not 
have applied to all matters of patent validity as of 1791; instead it would 
depend on the nature of the repeal process contemplated by the 1790 
Act. Of course, the character of statutory repeal was itself a vexed 
question.  
Open Questions. The predominant fact about patent repeal in 
the early Republic is that so much about its operation was uncertain or 
disputed. What should be the constitutional significance of Founding-
era patent law’s unsettled meaning?  
To take procedure first: if early American patent law had clearly 
guaranteed a right of jury trial in repeal cases—or, conversely, if the 
1790 and 1793 Acts had explicitly created a summary judicial action to 
repeal patents—then that would be grist to the mill of the constitutional 
questions raised in Oil States. But instead the law was ambiguous. 
Scire facias, with its common law proceeding and jury trial on questions 
of fact, was not clearly adopted in the 1790 or 1793 Acts. After a few 
years of practice, at least some parties and courts chose to behave as 
though the statutory action took the form of a scire facias.225 Others, 
however, resisted the proposition or, in the case of New York’s federal 
judges in the 1810s and 1820s, rejected it forcefully.226 To be sure, there 
were hints in the 1790s that the acts contemplated a full trial to follow 
the initial repeal hearing.227 But that point was unclear, allowing later 
courts to argue plausibly for a summary process. On this point, the 
Supreme Court did ultimately rule: in Ex parte Wood in 1824, the 
nature of the statutory process was settled in favor of scire facias at 
common law, with a jury trial on questions of fact.228 But it would be 
misleading to think that Ex parte Wood confirmed what had always 
been true; the fact is that for decades there was no right answer. 
Other aspects of this history raise a different, more diffuse 
question: What does repeal tell us about the “nature” of a patent right? 
As ahistorical as it is to ascribe a fixed nature to patents, that task was 
directly before the Oil States Court. Petitioners contended that IPR fell 
afoul of Article III’s constitutional prohibition on “withdraw[ing] from 
judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of 
 
 225. See supra text accompanying notes 193–197 (noting that, given a lack of guidance, both 
parties and courts tentatively relied upon scire facias). 
 226. See supra text accompanying notes 200–213 (arguing that the American repeal statute 
did not incorporate scire facias). 
 227. See supra text accompanying notes 113–115 (describing Thomas Jefferson’s letter to 
Hugh Williamson) and text accompanying notes 141–142 (recounting the denouement of Folger v. 
Jenkins). 
 228. See supra text accompanying notes 214–217. 
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a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.”229 Respondents 
and the government pointed to the exception for “public” rights that are 
integrally related to a federal statutory scheme.230 As a result, the 
Article III question in Oil States turned on whether patent validity 
involved matters of “private” or “public” rights.231 The Court chose the 
latter path by seizing on the long-standing idea, most closely associated 
with the mid-nineteenth century,232 that a patent is a type of 
“franchise.”233  
Although not used by the Court, the history of early American 
patent law could have provided more direct evidence of the public 
nature of the grant. Universal standing to seek repeal falls into this 
category. For any member of the public to have had standing to institute 
repeal, simply on the grounds that an invention was not new and thus 
did not comply with the requirements of the statute, suggests a broader 
public stake in the working of the system. It recognized the harm caused 
to all by the existence of an improper patent and the right of the public 
to ensure that only a true inventor benefited from the law. A property 
susceptible to public challenge in this way might well be considered 
“integrated into a public regulatory scheme” for Article III purposes.234 
And just what was that scheme, in the terms of its own time? 
This is the history that perhaps has the most potential to vindicate the 
conclusion of Oil States. The Oil States Court’s key determination was 
that IPR “involves the same basic matter as the grant of a patent,”235 
because it represents “a second look at an earlier administrative 
grant.”236 In other words, there is no hard constitutional line between 
pre-grant and post-grant patents for the purposes of review and 
 
 229. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011) (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & 
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855)). 
 230. See id. at 490–91 (“[W]hat makes a right ‘public’ rather than private is that the right is 
integrally related to particular federal government action.”); see also Granfinanciera, S.A. v. 
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989) (noting that where Congress has acted “for a valid legislative 
purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I,” it may delegate even a “seemingly 
private right” to non–Article III courts if the right “is so closely integrated into a public regulatory 
scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 231. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373–74 
(2018). 
 232. See, e.g., Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852) (“The franchise which 
the patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, using, or 
vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee.”). 
 233. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373–74. 
 234. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54. 
 235. Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374. 
 236. Id. (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016)). 
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repeal.237 The history of early American patent law tends to support the 
point. Statutory repeal within one or three years was designed as an 
auxiliary to the granting process—a “second look,” in the words of the 
Oil States Court.238 The majority’s elision of the difference between 
issuing patents and revoking them attracted stiff criticism from the Oil 
States dissenters,239 but it is entirely consistent with early American 
practice.  
Historical support for the general principle of post-grant review 
is only part of the story, though. Where the separation of powers is at 
issue, specific institutional choices matter. Here the history is cloudier. 
It is surely important that Congress made repeal a judicial affair: the 
executive itself was not given the power to claw back patents that it had 
issued. But the line between judicial and administrative functions was 
also not a bright one in the early patent system. The patent board under 
the 1790 Act could hardly examine applications in the modern sense 
(especially for novelty), while the 1793 Act offered no meaningful 
administrative screening at all. Under these circumstances, assigning 
repeal proceedings to the courts meant placing them in the hands of the 
institution principally responsible for determining patent validity. 
Whether that action was based on institutional competence or 
separation of powers was a heavily contested question in its day. The 
district judges who heard repeal suits in the 1820s and 1830s asserted 
their power to police invalidity broadly in revocation proceedings. For 
Judge Van Ness in New York, repeal was explicitly a part of the 
administration of the patent law: a post-grant review where no prior 
examination existed.240 Conversely, Justice Story for the Supreme 
Court in Ex parte Wood presented the issued patent as a settled 
“property . . . of which the law intended to give [its owner] the absolute 
enjoyment and possession,” with all applicable guarantees of law and 
equity.241 Some readers of Ex parte Wood will be inclined to see this 
statement as authoritative, defining the nature of patent rights in the 
early Republic and obliterating alternative conceptions. The evidence of 
historical practice is less clear-cut. 
The United States finally gained an administrative patent 
system in 1836, at which point statutory revocation disappeared from 
 
 237. See also id. at 1347 (“The primary distinction between inter partes review and the initial 
grant of a patent is that inter partes review occurs after the patent has issued. But that distinction 
does not make a difference here.”). 
 238. Id. at 1374. 
 239. See id. at 1385 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Just because you give a gift doesn't mean you 
forever enjoy the right to reclaim it. And, as we've seen, just because the Executive could issue an 
invention (or land) patent did not mean the Executive could revoke it.”).  
 240. See supra text accompanying note 202. 
 241. Ex parte Wood & Brundage, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 603, 608 (1824). 
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the law. To apply the history of the pre-1836 period to modern questions 
is inevitably an act of transposition, setting the assumptions of the early 
Republic amid the structures of the modern administrative state. As a 
historical matter, though, the fact remains: under America’s first patent 
acts, a wrongfully issued new patent was one that the public retained 
the power to reject. 
 
